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GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q — fission

Fix: fission/fission#3366

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is a security vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Fission runtime pods automount the fission-fetcher service-account token into the user function container, granting function code namespace-wide secret / configmap read

Also known asCVE-2026-46617GO-2026-5241
Published
May 21, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Fission runtime pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher, and the fission-fetcher ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide get on secrets and configmaps (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the Function.spec.secrets allowlist that the function specification suggests.

Affected component

  • pkg/executor/executortype/poolmgr/gp_deployment.go:154-156 — pool-manager runtime pod ServiceAccountName.
  • pkg/executor/executortype/newdeploy/newdeploy.go:225-227 — new-deploy runtime pod ServiceAccountName.
  • pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go:51-64 — fission-fetcher RBAC: namespace-wide get on secrets / configmaps.

Impact

A user able to deploy or update a function in any namespace where Fission runtime pods are scheduled could:

  1. Read every secret in that namespace (TLS keys, OIDC client secrets, database credentials, cloud provider credentials).
  2. Read every configmap in that namespace.
  3. Use those credentials to pivot to other Kubernetes resources or external systems the secrets unlock.

This violates the principle that Function.spec.secrets is the authoritative declaration of which secrets a function can read.

Root cause

The fetcher sidecar legitimately needs the SA token to call the Fission control plane and fetch package archives. Setting ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher on the pod gives every container in the pod (including the user container) the automounted token. Kubernetes does not provide per-container service-account scoping inside a single pod, so the user container has to be moved into a separate identity / token-mount scheme.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:

  • PR #3366 (commit fe1842ef):
    • The user function container now sets AutomountServiceAccountToken: false at the container level (via projected-volume token suppression), so the user container no longer sees the pod's SA token even though the fetcher sidecar still does.
    • The fetcher sidecar retains its existing token mount (separate projected volume) since it needs cluster API access for its own work.
    • For the few legitimate use cases where a function needs its own Kubernetes API access, the user is expected to mount a different ServiceAccount via Function.spec.podspec with the minimum necessary RBAC (documented separately).

Mitigation (until upgrade)

  1. Restrict who can create / update Function and Package CRDs in your cluster — treat the ability to ship function code as equivalent to namespace-wide secret read.
  2. Reduce the fission-fetcher ClusterRole / Role scope where possible (e.g. constrain it to specific named secrets via separate Role bindings).
  3. Add NetworkPolicy egress rules denying function pods access to the Kubernetes API server (this blunts the token even if it leaks).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/fission/fissionall versions1.23.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.23.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Fission runtime pods were created with `ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher`, and the `fission-fetcher` ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide `get` on `secrets` and `configmaps` (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the `Function.spec.secrets` allowlist
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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