How severe is GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q affects the following packages: github.com/fission/fission (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 27th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q?

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is classified as CWE-250 (CWE-250), Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269), CWE-538 (CWE-538). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q was published on May 21, 2026 and was last updated on July 21, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q

Fix: fission/fission#3366

GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is a CWE-250 vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fission runtime pods automount the fission-fetcher service-account token into the user function container, granting function code namespace-wide secret / configmap read

Also known asCVE-2026-46617GO-2026-5241

Published

May 21, 2026

Updated

Jul 21, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Aug 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs27th percentile — riskier than 27% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Fission runtime pods were created with ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher, and the fission-fetcher ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide get on secrets and configmaps (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the Function.spec.secrets allowlist that the function specification suggests.

Affected component

pkg/executor/executortype/poolmgr/gp_deployment.go:154-156 — pool-manager runtime pod ServiceAccountName.
pkg/executor/executortype/newdeploy/newdeploy.go:225-227 — new-deploy runtime pod ServiceAccountName.
pkg/utils/serviceaccount.go:51-64 — fission-fetcher RBAC: namespace-wide get on secrets / configmaps.

Impact

A user able to deploy or update a function in any namespace where Fission runtime pods are scheduled could:

Read every secret in that namespace (TLS keys, OIDC client secrets, database credentials, cloud provider credentials).
Read every configmap in that namespace.
Use those credentials to pivot to other Kubernetes resources or external systems the secrets unlock.

This violates the principle that Function.spec.secrets is the authoritative declaration of which secrets a function can read.

Root cause

The fetcher sidecar legitimately needs the SA token to call the Fission control plane and fetch package archives. Setting ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher on the pod gives every container in the pod (including the user container) the automounted token. Kubernetes does not provide per-container service-account scoping inside a single pod, so the user container has to be moved into a separate identity / token-mount scheme.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:

PR #3366 (commit fe1842ef):
- The user function container now sets AutomountServiceAccountToken: false at the container level (via projected-volume token suppression), so the user container no longer sees the pod's SA token even though the fetcher sidecar still does.
- The fetcher sidecar retains its existing token mount (separate projected volume) since it needs cluster API access for its own work.
- For the few legitimate use cases where a function needs its own Kubernetes API access, the user is expected to mount a different ServiceAccount via Function.spec.podspec with the minimum necessary RBAC (documented separately).

Mitigation (until upgrade)

Restrict who can create / update Function and Package CRDs in your cluster — treat the ability to ship function code as equivalent to namespace-wide secret read.
Reduce the fission-fetcher ClusterRole / Role scope where possible (e.g. constrain it to specific named secrets via separate Role bindings).
Add NetworkPolicy egress rules denying function pods access to the Kubernetes API server (this blunts the token even if it leaks).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/fission/fission`	all versions	1.23.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Fission runtime pods were created with `ServiceAccountName: fission-fetcher`, and the `fission-fetcher` ServiceAccount was granted namespace-wide `get` on `secrets` and `configmaps` (it needs that to load function code, env vars, and config). The runtime pod's automounted token was reachable from inside the user's function container at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`, so user-supplied function code inherited the same Kubernetes API privileges and could read any secret or configmap in the function's namespace — far beyond the `Function.spec.secrets` allowlist

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-85g2-pmrx-r49q across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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