GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq
Hickory DNS's Record Cache Accepts AUTHORITY-Section NS from Sibling Zone via Parent-Pool Zone-Context Elevation
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
The Hickory DNS project's experimental hickory-recursor crate's record cache (DnsLru) stores records from DNS responses keyed by each record's own (name, type), not by the query that triggered the response. cache_response() in crates/recursor/src/lib.rs chains ANSWER, AUTHORITY, and ADDITIONAL sections into one record iterator before insertion. The bailiwick filter it applies uses the zone context of the NS pool that serviced the lookup, not the zone being queried.
This creates a cross-zone poisoning path. When Hickory builds the NS pool for attacker.poc. it uses the parent poc. NS pool (ns.zone() = "poc."). If the poc. nameserver under the attacker's control includes in its response's AUTHORITY section a record for a sibling zone like victim.poc. NS ns.evil.poc., the bailiwick check is_subzone("poc.", "victim.poc.") passes (victim.poc. is a subdomain of poc.). The record is stored under (victim.poc., NS) in the shared cache.
Subsequently, any client querying a name in victim.poc. causes Hickory to build its NS pool from the poisoned cache entry, routing queries to the attacker's nameserver (ns.evil.poc.) rather than to the legitimate nameserver for victim.poc.. The legitimate NS for that zone receives zero queries.
This issue is fixed in hickory-resolver 0.26.0 with the recursor feature through an architectural change to response-level caching: responses are stored keyed by the originating query (name, type). A response to (attacker.poc. NS) is stored only under that key and cannot affect the (victim.poc., NS) cache entry.
Hickory DNS believes this issue has been present in all published versions of the experimental hickory-recursor crate, which has now been folded into the hickory-resolver crate under the non-default recursor feature flag. The hickory-recursor crate will not receive any updates going forward and all users should migrate to hickory-resolver with the recursor feature.
Users of the hickory-dns binary configured with the opt-in recursor feature and a configuration acting as a recursive resolver should update to 0.26.0+.
Reporter
Qifan Zhang, Palo Alto Networks
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | hickory-recursor | ≥ 0.24.0&&< 0.26.0 | 0.26.0 |
| 🦀crates.io | hickory-recursor | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hickory-recursor. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update hickory-recursor to 0.26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-83hf-93m4-rgwq across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.