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GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx

HIGH

Arbitrary File Read/Write via Hardlink Target Escape Through Symlink Chain in node-tar Extraction

Also known asCVE-2026-26960
Published
Feb 18, 2026
Updated
Feb 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk20th percentile+0.28%
0.00%0.26%0.53%0.79%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.3%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

tarnpm
104.8Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

tar.extract() in Node tar allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options.

This enables arbitrary file read and write as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no preservePaths).

Severity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive.

Details

The bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink:

  1. a/b/c/up -> ../..
  2. a/b/escape -> c/up/../..
  3. exfil (hardlink) -> a/b/escape/<target-relative-to-parent-of-extract>

Why this works:

  • Linkpath checks are string-based and do not resolve symlinks on disk for hardlink target safety.

    • See STRIPABSOLUTEPATH logic in:
      • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:255
      • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:268
      • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:281
  • Hardlink extraction resolves target as path.resolve(cwd, entry.linkpath) and then calls fs.link(target, destination).

    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:566
    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:567
    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:703
  • Parent directory safety checks (mkdir + symlink detection) are applied to the destination path of the extracted entry, not to the resolved hardlink target path.

    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:617
    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:619
    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:27
    • ../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:101

As a result, exfil is created inside extraction root but linked to an external file. The PoC confirms shared inode and successful read+write via exfil.

PoC

hardlink.js Environment used for validation:

  • Node: v25.4.0
  • tar: 7.5.7
  • OS: macOS Darwin 25.2.0
  • Extract options: defaults (tar.extract({ file, cwd }))

Steps:

  1. Prepare/locate a tar module. If require('tar') is not available locally, set TAR_MODULE to an absolute path to a tar package directory.

  2. Run:

TAR_MODULE="$(cd '../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar' && pwd)" node hardlink.js
  1. Expected vulnerable output (key lines):
same_inode=true
read_ok=true
write_ok=true
result=VULNERABLE

Interpretation:

  • same_inode=true: extracted exfil and external secret are the same file object.
  • read_ok=true: reading exfil leaks external content.
  • write_ok=true: writing exfil modifies external file.

Impact

Vulnerability type:

  • Arbitrary file read/write via archive extraction path confusion and link resolution.

Who is impacted:

  • Any application/service that extracts attacker-controlled tar archives with Node tar defaults.
  • Impact scope is the privileges of the extracting process user.

Potential outcomes:

  • Read sensitive files reachable by the process user.
  • Overwrite writable files outside extraction root.
  • Escalate impact depending on deployment context (keys, configs, scripts, app data).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmtarall versions7.5.8

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tar. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tar to 7.5.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `tar.extract()` in Node `tar` allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options. This enables **arbitrary file read and write** as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no `preservePaths`). Severity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive. ### Details The bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink: 1. `a/b/c/up -> ../..` 2. `a/b/escape -> c/up/../..` 3. `exfil` (hardlink)
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.