CVE-2026-26960 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in tar. A fix is available for tar — see the affected versions and patch details below.
node-tar has Arbitrary File Read/Write via Hardlink Target Escape Through Symlink Chain in Extraction
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-26960.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-26960 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
tarnpmDescription
Summary
tar.extract() in Node tar allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options.
This enables arbitrary file read and write as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no preservePaths).
Severity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive.
Details
The bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink:
a/b/c/up -> ../..a/b/escape -> c/up/../..exfil(hardlink) ->a/b/escape/<target-relative-to-parent-of-extract>
Why this works:
-
Linkpath checks are string-based and do not resolve symlinks on disk for hardlink target safety.
- See
STRIPABSOLUTEPATHlogic in:../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:255../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:268../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:281
- See
-
Hardlink extraction resolves target as
path.resolve(cwd, entry.linkpath)and then callsfs.link(target, destination).../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:566../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:567../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:703
-
Parent directory safety checks (
mkdir+ symlink detection) are applied to the destination path of the extracted entry, not to the resolved hardlink target path.../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:617../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:619../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:27../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/mkdir.js:101
As a result, exfil is created inside extraction root but linked to an external file. The PoC confirms shared inode and successful read+write via exfil.
PoC
hardlink.js Environment used for validation:
- Node:
v25.4.0 - tar:
7.5.7 - OS: macOS Darwin 25.2.0
- Extract options: defaults (
tar.extract({ file, cwd }))
Steps:
-
Prepare/locate a
tarmodule. Ifrequire('tar')is not available locally, setTAR_MODULEto an absolute path to a tar package directory. -
Run:
TAR_MODULE="$(cd '../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar' && pwd)" node hardlink.js
- Expected vulnerable output (key lines):
same_inode=true
read_ok=true
write_ok=true
result=VULNERABLE
Interpretation:
same_inode=true: extractedexfiland external secret are the same file object.read_ok=true: readingexfilleaks external content.write_ok=true: writingexfilmodifies external file.
Impact
Vulnerability type:
- Arbitrary file read/write via archive extraction path confusion and link resolution.
Who is impacted:
- Any application/service that extracts attacker-controlled tar archives with Node
tardefaults. - Impact scope is the privileges of the extracting process user.
Potential outcomes:
- Read sensitive files reachable by the process user.
- Overwrite writable files outside extraction root.
- Escalate impact depending on deployment context (keys, configs, scripts, app data).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | tar | all versions | 7.5.8npm install tar@7.5.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tar, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update tar to 7.5.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-26960 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-26960 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-26960. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
In Red Hat environments, this condition introduces a significant constraint, as exploitation requires user interaction and reliance on unsafe handling of externally supplied archives. The attack is not remotely exploitable in isolation and depends on a user or service processing attacker-controlled input. Furthermore,…
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Network Observability (NETOBSERV) 1.11.0 | network-observability/network-observability-console-plugin-rhel9:1774431617 | RHSA-2026:6428 |
| Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.27 | devspaces/code-rhel9:1774448966 | RHSA-2026:6192 |
| Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.3 | rhtas/rekor-search-ui-rhel9:1773308315 | RHSA-2026:5447 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-26960 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-26960 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.