What is GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

### Summary Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files. ### Details The problem lies in the way how the expanded javadoc files are served. The `GET /javadoc/{repository}/ /raw/ ` route uses the ` ` path parameter to find the file in the `javadocUnpackPath` directory and returns it's content to the user. [JavadocFacade.kt#L77](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/blob/68b73f19dc9811ccf10936430cf17f7b0e622bd6/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocFacade.kt#L77

How severe is GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 has a CVSS score of 8.2/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 affects the following packages: com.reposilite:reposilite-backend (Maven). Ecosystems affected: Maven.

How do I fix GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

Update com.reposilite:reposilite-backend to 3.5.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 in my Maven dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.reposilite:reposilite-backend. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 3.1%, placing it in the 86th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 is classified as Path Traversal (CWE-22). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

Is there exploit tooling available for GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93?

A Nuclei detection template exists for GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93, meaning automated scanners can fingerprint it. Public exploit tooling significantly increases real-world risk — prioritize patching and ensure detection coverage. Exploit tooling should only ever be used in isolated, authorized testing environments.

When was GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 was published on November 4, 2024 and was last updated on November 5, 2024. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

☕ Maven

GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93

HIGH

Reposilite vulnerable to path traversal while serving javadoc expanded files (arbitrary file read) (`GHSL-2024-074`)

Also known asCVE-2024-36117

Published

Nov 4, 2024

Updated

Nov 5, 2024

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

3.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk86th percentile-71.50%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

☕com.reposilite:reposilite-backend

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files.

Details

The problem lies in the way how the expanded javadoc files are served. The GET /javadoc/{repository}/<gav>/raw/<resource> route uses the <resource> path parameter to find the file in the javadocUnpackPath directory and returns it's content to the user.

JavadocFacade.kt#L77:

fun findRawJavadocResource(request: JavadocRawRequest): Result<JavadocRawResponse, ErrorResponse> =
   with (request) {
       mavenFacade.canAccessResource(accessToken, repository, gav)
           .flatMap { javadocContainerService.loadContainer(accessToken, repository, gav) }
           .filter({ Files.exists(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString())) }, { notFound("Resource $resource not found") })
           .map {
               JavadocRawResponse(
                   contentType = supportedExtensions[resource.getExtension()] ?: ContentType.APPLICATION_OCTET_STREAM,
                   content = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toString()))
               )
           }
   }

In this case, the <resource> path parameter can contain path traversal characters such as /../../. Since the path is concatenated with the main directory, it opens the possibility to read files outside the javadocUnpackPath directory.

Impact

This issue may lead to Arbitrary File Read on the server. A potential attacker can read some sensitive file, such as reposilite.db, that contains the sqlite database used by Reposilite. This database contains the sensitive information used by Reposilite, including passwords and hashes of issued tokens. Also, the configuration.cdn file can be read, which contains other sensitive properties.

Steps to reproduce

Start the Reposilite instance on http://localhost:8080/
Find at least one javadoc file in the hosted repositories. For example, the default test workspace contains the /releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar archive that is suitable for our attack.
Send a GET request to http://127.0.0.1:8080/javadoc/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/raw/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2freposilite.db When this request is processed on the server, Reposilite tries to unpack the /repositories/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/javadoc-1.0.0-javadoc.jar file into the /javadocs/releases/javadoc/1.0.0/.cache/unpack folder. Then, it tries to read the ../../../../../../reposilite.db file from this folder, which triggers the path traversal attack.

Remediation

Normalize (remove all occurrences of /../) the <resource> path parameter before using it when reading the file. For example:

content = Files.newInputStream(it.javadocUnpackPath.resolve(resource.toPath()))

Changing resource.toString() to resource.toPath() is enough here as the com.reposilite.storage.api.Location#toPath method normalizes the string internally.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
☕Maven	`com.reposilite:reposilite-backend`	≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.5.12	3.5.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.reposilite:reposilite-backend. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update com.reposilite:reposilite-backend to 3.5.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Reposilite v3.5.10 is affected by an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability via path traversal while serving expanded javadoc files. ### Details The problem lies in the way how the expanded javadoc files are served. The `GET /javadoc/{repository}/<gav>/raw/<resource>` route uses the `<resource>` path parameter to find the file in the `javadocUnpackPath` directory and returns it's content to the user. [JavadocFacade.kt#L77](https://github.com/dzikoysk/reposilite/blob/68b73f19dc9811ccf10936430cf17f7b0e622bd6/reposilite-backend/src/main/kotlin/com/reposilite/javadocs/JavadocFacade.kt#L77

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-82j3-hf72-7x93 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works