How severe is GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 affects the following packages: github.com/fission/fission (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.4%, placing it in the 30th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339?

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is classified as OS Command Injection (CWE-78), CWE-250 (CWE-250), Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 was published on May 21, 2026 and was last updated on June 25, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339

Fix: fission/fission#3364

GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fission builder accepts arbitrary buildcmd strings from Environment.spec.builder.command, allowing the builder pod to invoke arbitrary executables

Also known asCVE-2026-46618GO-2026-5230

Published

May 21, 2026

Updated

Jun 25, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Aug 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.

Affected component

pkg/builder/builder.go:254 — call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).
pkg/builder/builder.go:106 — input source: buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].

Impact

A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:

Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its /packages shared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package).
Write arbitrary content into the /packages shared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.

The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.

Root cause

pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.

Fix

Released in v1.23.0:

PR #3364 (commit 0f45c911) introduces Builder.resolveBuildCommand in pkg/builder/builder.go, which:
1. Accepts an empty string (treated as the default /build).
2. Accepts the literal /build.
3. Accepts any absolute path that survives filepath.Clean and contains no .. segments.
4. Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
exec.Command still receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come from strings.Fields of the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.

Mitigation (until upgrade)

Restrict who can create / update Environment CRDs to trusted operators only.
Audit Environment.spec.builder.command values for any non-/build paths.
Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/fission/fission`	all versions	1.23.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Before the round-1 security sweep, `pkg/builder/builder.go` passed `Environment.spec.builder.command` directly into `exec.Command(...)` after a `strings.Fields` split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update `Environment` CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. `/bin/sh -c '...'`) and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context. ### Affected component - `pkg/builder/builder.go:254` — call site (`exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs..

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works