Fission builder accepts arbitrary buildcmd strings from Environment.spec.builder.command, allowing the builder pod to invoke arbitrary executablesGHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339
Fix: fission/fission#3364GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/fission/fissionReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.
Affected component
pkg/builder/builder.go:254— call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).pkg/builder/builder.go:106— input source:buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].
Impact
A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:
- Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
- Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its
/packagesshared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package). - Write arbitrary content into the
/packagesshared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.
The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.
Root cause
pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
- PR #3364 (commit
0f45c911) introducesBuilder.resolveBuildCommandinpkg/builder/builder.go, which:- Accepts an empty string (treated as the default
/build). - Accepts the literal
/build. - Accepts any absolute path that survives
filepath.Cleanand contains no..segments. - Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
- Accepts an empty string (treated as the default
exec.Commandstill receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come fromstrings.Fieldsof the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.
Mitigation (until upgrade)
- Restrict who can create / update
EnvironmentCRDs to trusted operators only. - Audit
Environment.spec.builder.commandvalues for any non-/buildpaths. - Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/fission/fission | all versions | 1.23.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.23.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.23.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.