GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9
HIGHGHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in tauri. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Tauri has an Origin Confusion Issue that Allows Remote Pages to Invoke Local-Only IPC Commands
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 356,453 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
tauriReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A flaw in Tauri's is_local_url() function causes it to incorrectly classify remote URLs as trusted local origins on Windows and Android. On these systems, Tauri maps custom URI scheme protocols to http://<scheme>.localhost/ because those platforms' WebView implementations cannot serve custom URI schemes directly.
The issue is that Tauri's check to see if the origin is local, only checks the first subdomain of the URL. An attacker can abuse this by hosting a page on a domain whose subdomain matches the custom scheme of the application (e.g. http://app.attacker.com/)."
Example:
- Local URL:
app://localhost/→ on Android/Windows:http://app.localhost/ - The check passes for any URL starting with
http://app., includinghttp://app.evil.com/
As a result, the attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins.
Details
Vulnerable function:
#[cfg(any(windows, target_os = "android"))]
let local = {
let protocol_url = self.manager().tauri_protocol_url(uses_https);
let maybe_protocol = current_url
.domain()
.and_then(|d| d.split_once('.')) // BUG: only splits on first dot
.unwrap_or_default()
.0;
protocols.contains_key(maybe_protocol) && scheme == protocol_url.scheme()
};
split_once('.') discards everything after the first .. For http://app.evil.com/, the extracted label is app. If the application has registered a protocol named app, protocols.contains_key("app") returns true and the URL is classified as Origin::Local. The correct check must assert the full domain is exactly <protocol>.localhost.
PoC
We created a proof of concept app that can be found here. The app registers a custom app:// protocol and exposes a ping command restricted to local origins only. It provides a button to open a URL in a WebView, pre-filled with https://app.robbe-bc9.workers.dev/, an attacker-controlled page that invokes ping on load. Because the domain's first label matches the registered app protocol, is_local_url() classifies it as a local origin and the command succeeds.
capabilities/main.json contains the following code, which only exposes ping locally:
{
"$schema": "../../../crates/tauri-schema-generator/schemas/capability.schema.json",
"identifier": "main",
"local": true,
"windows": ["*"],
"permissions": [
"sample:allow-ping"
]
}
src/lib.rs contains the following code, to register a custom scheme:
tauri::Builder::default()
.register_uri_scheme_protocol("app", |_ctx, _request| { ... })
Impact
The attacker page can invoke backend commands that the developer intended to be accessible only to the app's own frontend and that are explicitly restricted from being called by external or remote origins.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | tauri | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.11.1 | 2.11.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tauri. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update tauri to 2.11.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7gmj-67g7-phm9 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.