GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-770 vulnerability in axios. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Axios
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
axiosnpmDescription
Summary
Axios versions 1.7.0 through 1.15.x did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the fetch adapter. Applications that selected adapter: 'fetch', or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than maxContentLength or maxBodyLength despite those limits being explicitly configured.
This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large data: URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on maxBodyLength as a boundary.
Impact
The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources.
This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: maxContentLength and maxBodyLength default to -1. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them.
Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion.
Affected Functionality
Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in fetch adapter with finite maxContentLength or maxBodyLength values.
Relevant configurations include:
adapter: 'fetch'adapter: ['fetch', ...]whenfetchis selected- environments where neither
xhrnorhttpis available and axios falls back tofetch - custom fetch environments configured through
env.fetch
Unaffected functionality includes:
- Node.js default
httpadapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced
- configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits
Technical Details
In vulnerable versions, lib/adapters/fetch.js destructured request config without maxContentLength or maxBodyLength. The adapter dispatched fetch() and then materialized the response through text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit.
The fix in e5540dc added:
maxContentLengthandmaxBodyLengthreads inlib/adapters/fetch.js- upfront
data:URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch
Content-Lengthresponse pre-checks- streaming response enforcement
- fallback checks for environments without
ReadableStream - regression tests in
tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js
Proof of Concept of Attack
import http from 'node:http';
import axios from 'axios';
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
let received = 0;
req.on('data', chunk => {
received += chunk.length;
});
req.on('end', () => {
res.end(JSON.stringify({ received }));
});
});
await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve));
const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`;
await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), {
adapter: 'fetch',
maxBodyLength: 1024
});
// Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes.
// Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST.
server.close();
Workarounds
Use the Node.js http adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant.
Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios.
Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially data: URLs, before calling axios.
Summary
When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage.
Details
maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow:
- lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls.
- lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement.
- lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits.
PoC
Environment:
- Axios main at commit f7a4ee2
- Node v24.2.0
Steps:
- Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}.
- Send 2 MiB with:
- adapter: 'fetch'
- maxBodyLength: 1024
- Request a 4 KiB data: URL with:
- adapter: 'fetch'
- maxContentLength: 16
Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed:
- Upload: success, server received 2097152
- data: response: success, length 4096
Impact
Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes.
</details>Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | axios | ≥ 1.7.0&&< 1.16.0 | 1.16.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update axios to 1.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
Important: A denial of service flaw was found in Axios, a JavaScript HTTP client library. This issue arises when applications utilize the `fetch` adapter, as configured request and response size limits are not properly enforced. A remote attacker could exploit this by sending or receiving excessively large data…
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-777c-7fjr-54vf across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.