How severe is GHSA-767h-63j4-5226?

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 has a CVSS score of 6.5/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-767h-63j4-5226?

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 affects the following packages: decidim-core (RubyGems), decidim-core (RubyGems), decidim-core (RubyGems). Ecosystems affected: RubyGems.

How do I fix GHSA-767h-63j4-5226?

Update decidim-core to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 in my RubyGems dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-767h-63j4-5226?

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 40th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-767h-63j4-5226?

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200), CWE-284 (CWE-284). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 was published on July 13, 2026 and was last updated on July 13, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

💎

💎 RubyGems

Not in CISA KEV

MEDIUM severity

Decidim: Private exports can be downloaded through reusable linksGHSA-767h-63j4-5226

MEDIUMFix: decidim/decidim#16680

GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in decidim-core. A fix is available for decidim-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-45377

Published

Jul 13, 2026

Updated

Jul 13, 2026

Affected

3 pkgs

Patched

3 / 3

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-767h-63j4-5226.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs40th percentile — riskier than 40% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected

💎decidim-core💎decidim-core💎decidim-core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The normal download_your_data flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it.

Technical description

This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file correctly scopes the export record to current_user, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner.

Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs.

Reproduction steps:

Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI.

Sign in as [email protected] at http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in.
Open http://localhost:3001/download_your_data.
Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable.
Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f .

Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route.

While still signed in as [email protected], open the wrapper URL in the browser.
Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user.

Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain.

In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request.
Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>.
Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check.

Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication.

Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session.
Paste the copied http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME> URL.
Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner.

Impact

Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL.

Patches

See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680

Workarounds

Disable Private Downloads URLs

Reference

OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control

Credits

This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
💎RubyGems	`decidim-core`	all versions	0.30.9`bundle update decidim-core --conservative`
💎RubyGems	`decidim-core`	≥ 0.31.0.rc1&&< 0.31.5	0.31.5`bundle update decidim-core --conservative`
💎RubyGems	`decidim-core`	≥ 0.32.0.rc1&&< 0.32.0	0.32.0`bundle update decidim-core --conservative`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update decidim-core to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-767h-63j4-5226 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Description The normal `download_your_data` flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it. ## Technical description This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. `Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file` correctly scopes the export record to `current_user`, so the wrapper route itself is not directly acc