GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) CWE-347 vulnerability in github.com/coder/coder/v2. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Coder: PKCS#7 signature bypass in Azure instance identity allows unauthenticated agent token theft
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 360,399 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coderReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
azureidentity.Validate() verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. {"vmId":"<target>"} and the forged vmId will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent's session token.
No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM's vmId which is a UUIDv4.
that's a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited
Root Cause
In unpatched Coder releases the signature over the PKCS#7 content is not validated - only the signing certificate is checked.
Impact
An attacker on any Azure VM or with access to a publicly available Azure IMDS certificate from CT logs can:
- Steal an agent session token by sending a forged PKCS#7 envelope to
POST /api/v2/workspaceagents/azure-instance-identitywhich is unauthenticated. - With the stolen token access:
- Git SSH private key via
GET /workspaceagents/me/gitsshkey: push to repositories and impersonate the workspace owner. - OAuth access tokens via
GET /workspaceagents/me/external-auth: GitHub, GitLab, and Bitbucket tokens in plaintext. - Workspace secrets via the agent manifest: environment variables, file paths, and API keys.
- Git SSH private key via
Attack Path Diagram
<img width="5588" height="4176" alt="PKCS7_diagram (1)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74e88a89-a995-450d-87ab-6feed03579a5" />Affected Versions
All versions of Coder v2 are affected.
Patches
Fixed in #25286
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
Workarounds
If unable to patch we recommend immediately reconfiguring any Azure templates to use token authentication rather than azure-instance-identity until the patch is released and you are fully upgraded.
- Modify the
coder_agent.authvalue to betoken. - Add
CODER_AGENT_TOKEN=${coder_agent.main.token}to the set of environment variables for the Coder Workspace Agent initialization script.
Recognition
We'd like to thank Ben Tran of calif.io and Anthropic’s Security Team (ANT-2026-22445) for independently disclosing this issue!
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.33.0-rc.0&&< 2.33.3 | 2.33.3 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.32.0-rc.0&&< 2.32.2 | 2.32.2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.31.0&&< 2.31.12 | 2.31.12 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.30.0&&< 2.30.8 | 2.30.8 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.29.0&&< 2.29.13 | 2.29.13 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | all versions | 2.24.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coder/coder/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.33.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6x44-w3xg-hqqf across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.