Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐘 Packagist

GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6

MEDIUM

GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) Path Traversal vulnerability in openmage/magento-lts. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module

Also known asCVE-2026-25525
Published
Apr 21, 2026
Updated
Apr 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘openmage/magento-lts

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

MetricValueJustification
Attack Vector (AV)NetworkExploitable via admin panel
Attack Complexity (AC)LowSimple bypass pattern
Privileges Required (PR)HighRequires admin authentication
User Interaction (UI)NoneNo additional user interaction needed
Scope (S)UnchangedImpacts the vulnerable component
Confidentiality (C)HighCan read sensitive system files
Integrity (I)NoneRead-only vulnerability
Availability (A)NoneNo impact on availability

Affected Products

  • OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1
  • All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths

Affected Files

FileLineVulnerable Code
app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php67str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))
app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php63str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))

Vulnerability Details

The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:

$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:

Bypass Examples

InputAfter str_replace('../', '', ...)Result
..././../Bypass
....//../Bypass
..././..././..././etc/passwd../../../etc/passwdFile read

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)
  2. Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles
  3. Create or modify an import profile
  4. Set the files parameter to: ..././..././..././etc/passwd
  5. Run the profile to read the contents of /etc/passwd

Proof of Concept

# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd

# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd

# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd

Remediation

Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:

// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
    . basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));

Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.

Workarounds

If immediate upgrade is not possible:

  1. Restrict admin access: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only
  2. Disable Dataflow: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely
  3. Web Application Firewall: Block requests containing path traversal patterns
  4. File permissions: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions
  5. Monitor admin activity: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution

Impact

An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:

  • /etc/passwd - System user information
  • app/etc/local.xml - Database credentials
  • .env files - Environment secrets
  • Log files - Potentially sensitive application data
  • Configuration files - Server and application configuration

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.

Timeline

  • 2025-12-31: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
  • 2026-01-21: Fix developed and tested

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistopenmage/magento-ltsall versions20.17.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openmage/magento-lts. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openmage/magento-lts to 20.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (`str_replace('../', '', $input)`) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like `..././` or `....//`, which after the replacement still result in `../`. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. | Metric | Value | Justification | | ------------------------ | --------- | ------------------------------------- | | Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel |
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.