How severe is GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf?

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf has a CVSS score of 7.5/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf?

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf affects the following packages: gitpython (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf?

Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf was published on July 24, 2026 and was last updated on July 24, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf

HIGH

GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks

Published

Jul 24, 2026

Updated

Jul 24, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍gitpython

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GitPython's unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template. git clone --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/ into the new repository and runs them (post-checkout fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.

Root Cause

base.py:145-152 defines unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"] — --template is absent. The guard candidate ['--template'] passes check_unsafe_options (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes post-checkout at checkout time. git's protocol.allow/GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL do not gate --template; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, /tmp, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

Proof of Concept

# attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)

Attack Chain

Setup: attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
Entry: Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>'). Guard: check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options). Bypass proof: --template not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate ['--template'], no error).
Sink: git copies the hook and executes post-checkout at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate ['--template'] passed with no error; staged post-checkout hook executed during clone_from, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (--template is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Add --template (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to unsafe_git_clone_options.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`gitpython`	all versions	3.1.54

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration. ## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and exe

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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