How severe is CVE-2026-73623?

No CVSS score has been assigned to CVE-2026-73623 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-73623?

CVE-2026-73623 affects the following packages: gitpython (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix CVE-2026-73623?

Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73623 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2026-73623 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2026-73623 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Is CVE-2026-73623 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2026-73623 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for CVE-2026-73623?

CVE-2026-73623 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.8%, placing it in the 57th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-73623?

CVE-2026-73623 is classified as OS Command Injection (CWE-78). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was CVE-2026-73623 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2026-73623 was published on August 13, 2026 and was last updated on October 21, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-73623 — gitpython

Fix: gitpython-developers/GitPython#2180

CVE-2026-73623 is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in gitpython. A fix is available for gitpython — see the affected versions and patch details below.

GitPython before 3.1.54 Remote Code Execution via --template

Also known asGHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gfPYSEC-2026-3952

Published

Aug 13, 2026

Updated

Oct 21, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73623.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs57th percentile — riskier than 57% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐍gitpython

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GitPython's unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template. git clone --template=<dir> copies <dir>/hooks/ into the new repository and runs them (post-checkout fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration.

Root Cause

base.py:145-152 defines unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"] — --template is absent. The guard candidate ['--template'] passes check_unsafe_options (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes post-checkout at checkout time. git's protocol.allow/GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL do not gate --template; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, /tmp, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.

Proof of Concept

# attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='<dir>')   # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)

Attack Chain

Setup: attacker stages <dir>/hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
Entry: Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='<dir>'). Guard: check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options). Bypass proof: --template not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate ['--template'], no error).
Sink: git copies the hook and executes post-checkout at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).

Bypass Evidence

Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate ['--template'] passed with no error; staged post-checkout hook executed during clone_from, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (--template is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.

Affected Versions

<= 3.1.53

Suggested Fix

Add --template (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to unsafe_git_clone_options.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`gitpython`	all versions	3.1.54`pip install --upgrade 'gitpython==3.1.54'`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

gitpythongitpython_project

< 3.1.54

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update gitpython to 3.1.54 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73623 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This is an Important severity flaw in GitPython where an incomplete denylist in `unsafe_git_clone_options` allows remote code execution. An attacker can leverage the `--template` option to execute arbitrary commands during repository cloning by pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks. This…

Product	Fixed in	Advisory
Red Hat Satellite 6.16 for RHEL 8	`foreman-0:3.12.0.23-1.el8sat`	RHSA-2026:74506
Red Hat Satellite 6.17 for RHEL 9	`foreman-0:3.14.0.22-1.el9sat`	RHSA-2026:74505
Red Hat Satellite 6.19 for RHEL 9	`python3.12-gitpython-0:3.1.59-1.el9pc`	RHSA-2026:63385
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5	`ansible-automation-platform-25/controller-rhel8:1789607021`	RHSA-2026:71210
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6	`ansible-automation-platform-26/controller-rhel9:1789673739`	RHSA-2026:71179
Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.7	`ansible-automation-platform-27/controller-rhel9:1788918363`	RHSA-2026:67279
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25	`rhoai/odh-workbench-jupyter-datascience-cpu-py312-rhel9:1788315638`	RHSA-2026:65126
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25	`rhoai/odh-feature-server-rhel9:1792148523`	RHSA-2026:87410

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration. ## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and exe