GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Netty SPDY SETTINGS frame count materializes unbounded settings map
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 367,996 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
io.netty:netty-codec-http☕io.netty:netty-codec-httpReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Netty's SPDY SETTINGS decoder accepts a peer-declared SETTINGS entry count up to the 24-bit frame-length limit and materializes every unique setting ID in DefaultSpdySettingsFrame without an implementation-level count cap. A remote SPDY/3.1 peer can send one syntactically valid roughly 2 MiB SETTINGS frame that creates 262144 map entries, amplifying network input into heap growth and ordered-map insertion work.
Details
Inbound SPDY bytes enter SpdyFrameCodec.decode() and are passed directly to the frame decoder. The decoder reads the peer-controlled flags and 24-bit frame length from the common header, then accepts SETTINGS frames with only length >= 4. For SETTINGS payloads, it reads the peer-controlled numSettings field and validates only that the remaining payload is divisible into 8-byte entries and exactly matches that count. Each accepted entry then supplies an attacker-controlled 24-bit ID and value, and the normal delegate path forwards it into spdySettingsFrame.setValue(). The sink is DefaultSpdySettingsFrame: it backs settings with a TreeMap, checks only that IDs fit the SPDY 24-bit maximum, and inserts a new Setting for each previously unseen ID. There is no count budget between the wire-format count validation and the TreeMap insertion site.
PoC
run with
bash ./poc/run.sh
expected output:
NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED settings_count=262144 wire_bytes=2097164 approx_heap_delta=17692272 first_value=1 last_value=262144
The NETTY_SPDY_SETTINGS_COUNT_MAP_TRIGGERED line means the harness decoded the crafted SETTINGS frame and observed all 262144 peer-selected IDs in the resulting settings map. The wire_bytes=2097164, first_value=1, and last_value=262144 fields distinguish this from a setup failure: they show the exact oversized frame was accepted and fully materialized.
Impact
remote unauthenticated network peer that can speak SPDY/3.1 to a Netty pipeline containing SpdyFrameCodec can trigger resource-exhaustion denial of service. The required guards are satisfied by a complete valid SETTINGS frame using the expected SPDY version, a length of 4 + numSettings * 8, and IDs within the accepted 24-bit range; the verified PoC uses numSettings=262144 and wire_bytes=2097164. On that input, Netty materializes 262144 attacker-controlled entries in a TreeMap-backed DefaultSpdySettingsFrame, with local runs observing about 17-18 MiB of heap growth per decoded frame plus CPU work for ordered-map insertion.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-http | ≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.16.Final | 4.2.16.Final |
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-http | ≥ 4.1.0.Final&&< 4.1.136.Final | 4.1.136.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.2.16.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-6jqx-86gh-f27w across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.