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GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm

HIGH

lakeFS vulnerable to path traversal in local block adapter allow cross-namespace and sibling directory access

Also known asCVE-2026-26187GO-2026-4494
Published
Feb 13, 2026
Updated
Feb 19, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk31th percentile+0.32%
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.4%Mar 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/treeverse/lakefs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Two path traversal vulnerabilities in the local block adapter allow authenticated users to read and write files outside their designated storage boundaries.

Details

The local block adapter in pkg/block/local/adapter.go had two path traversal vulnerabilities:

1. Prefix Bypass Vulnerability

The verifyRelPath function used strings.HasPrefix() to verify that requested paths fall within the configured storage directory. This check was insufficient because it validated only the path prefix without requiring a path separator, allowing access to sibling directories with similar names.

Example: If the adapter is configured with base path /data/lakefs:

PathExpectedActual
/data/lakefs/valid/file.txtAllowedAllowed
/data/lakefs_evil/secret.txtBlockedVulnerable
/data/lakefs_backup/data.dbBlockedVulnerable

2. Namespace Escape via Identifier

The adapter verified that resolved paths stayed within the adapter's base path, but did not verify that object identifiers stayed within their designated storage namespace. This allowed attackers to use path traversal sequences in the object identifier to access files in other namespaces.

Example: With base path /data/lakefs and namespace local://repo1/userdata:

IdentifierResolved PathExpectedActual
file.txt/data/lakefs/repo1/userdata/file.txtAllowedAllowed
../secrets/key.txt/data/lakefs/repo1/secrets/key.txtBlockedVulnerable
../../other-repo/data.txt/data/lakefs/other-repo/data.txtBlockedVulnerable

This vulnerability allows users with access to one namespace to read and write files in other namespaces within the same lakeFS deployment.

Impact

Authenticated lakeFS users can:

  • Read and write files in sibling directories that share the same path prefix as the storage directory (vulnerability 1)
  • Access files across namespaces by using path traversal in object identifiers (vulnerability 2)

This could allow attackers to:

  • Read sensitive data from other repositories/namespaces
  • Write malicious files to other namespaces
  • Read/write files in adjacent directories outside lakeFS storage
  • Potentially escalate privileges if writable directories are used by other services

This vulnerability only affects deployments using the local block adapter. Deployments using S3, GCS, Azure, or other object storage backends are not affected.

Patches

Fixed in version v1.77.0.

The fixes:

  1. Append a path separator to prefix checks, ensuring paths must be within the storage directory
  2. Add two-level path validation: verify both that namespace paths stay within the adapter's base path AND that resolved paths stay within their designated namespace

Workarounds

  • Configure the storage path with a unique name unlikely to be a prefix of other directories
  • Restrict filesystem permissions for the lakeFS process
  • Ensure no sensitive data exists in sibling directories

Credit

Discovered via CodeQL static analysis.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/treeverse/lakefsall versions1.77.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/treeverse/lakefs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/treeverse/lakefs to 1.77.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Two path traversal vulnerabilities in the local block adapter allow authenticated users to read and write files outside their designated storage boundaries. ## Details The local block adapter in `pkg/block/local/adapter.go` had two path traversal vulnerabilities: ### 1. Prefix Bypass Vulnerability The `verifyRelPath` function used `strings.HasPrefix()` to verify that requested paths fall within the configured storage directory. This check was insufficient because it validated only the path prefix without requiring a path separator, allowing access to sibling directories with si
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-699m-4v95-rmpm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.