GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5
MEDIUMUser with ci:ReadAction permissions and write permissions to one path in a repository may copy objects from any path in the repository
Blast Radius
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Description
Impact
A bug in permissions validation allows a user with the ci:ReadAction permission to skip read checks when copying an object. If they additionally have read and write permission to path in the repository, they can copy an otherwise unreadable object and read it.
In order to be affected and exploitable, the following conditions must ALL occur on the same user:
ci:ReadActionenabled for the repository. Predefined policies RepoManagementRead and RepoManagementFullAccess allow this action.fs:ReadObjectandfs:WriteObjectenabled for some path.fs:ReadObjectnot available for some path
Such a user can use (1) to copy the unreadable object (3) to a path that they can read and write (2). At that point they can read the object copy.
Patches
Releases >= 1.12.1 fix this issue in lakeFS.
Workarounds
As a workaround, use RBAC to deny ci:* permissions to all users, or to all users who have limited read access.
Many installations are unaffected:
- Installations using ACLs are not affected. This includes all OSS installations that have not implemented an external authorization server. We do not know of any OSS installations that have implemented such a server. ACLs that allow ci:ReadAction also allow reading repositories, so no capabilities are granted.
- Installations using RBAC that use only predefined policies with "all" ARNs ("*") are not affected. This includes all installations that have not defined any new groups in RBAC.
In order to be affected, installations using RBAC must define users and simultaneous allow ci:ReadAction and disallow fs:ReadObject for some path. ci:ReadAction is available in policies RepoManagementReadAll and RepoManagementFullAccess. By default these actions are configured for groups Developers and above, for all repositories and paths.
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/treeverse/lakefs | ≥ 0.90.0&&< 1.12.1 | 1.12.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/treeverse/lakefs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/treeverse/lakefs to 1.12.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fvv5-h29g-f6w5 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.