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📦 npm

GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f

@apollo/server vulnerable to unsafe application of Content Security Policy via reused nonces

Published
Jun 16, 2023
Updated
Jun 20, 2023
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@apollo/servernpm
2.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Context

Content Security Policies (CSP) are a defense-in-depth strategy against XSS attacks. Improper application of CSP isn't itself a vulnerability, but it does fail to prevent XSS in the event that there is a viable attack vector for an XSS attack.

Impact

There aren't any XSS attack vectors via the Apollo Server landing pages known to Apollo, so to our knowledge there is no impact. However, if there are existing XSS vectors that haven't been reported and patched, then all users of Apollo Server's landing pages have a vulnerability which won't be prevented by the current CSP implemented by the landing pages.

Prior to version 4.7.1, there was no CSP implemented at all. However, the initial CSP implementation (4.7.1+) reused nonces. While this sufficiently resolved the issue w.r.t. scripts not running in Safari, it did not implement CSP in a safe or conventional way.

Patches

The issue is patched in the latest version of Apollo Server, v4.7.4. The changes can be reviewed in the merge commit.

Workarounds

The landing page can be disabled completely until the patch can be upgraded to. https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages/#disabling-the-landing-page

References

https://content-security-policy.com/nonce/

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@apollo/server4.7.1&&< 4.7.44.7.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @apollo/server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @apollo/server to 4.7.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Context Content Security Policies (CSP) are a defense-in-depth strategy against XSS attacks. Improper application of CSP isn't itself a vulnerability, but it does fail to prevent XSS in the event that there is a viable attack vector for an XSS attack. ### Impact There aren't any XSS attack vectors via the Apollo Server landing pages _known to Apollo_, so to our knowledge there is no impact. However, if there are existing XSS vectors that haven't been reported and patched, then all users of Apollo Server's landing pages have a vulnerability which won't be prevented by the current CSP imple
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-68jh-rf6x-836f across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.