NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
☕
☕ Maven
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Attachment Processing (Allure 1, Allure 2, and XCTest Readers)GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw

HIGH

GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in io.qameta.allure:allure-generator. A fix is available for io.qameta.allure:allure-generator — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-33166
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs46th percentile — riskier than 46% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.05%0.0%0.5%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕io.qameta.allure:allure-generator

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report.

Details

The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if the resulting file remains within the intended results directory.

Affected Files and Lines:

Allure2Plugin.java (Line 264): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());

Allure1Plugin.java (Line 328): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());

XcTestPlugin.java (Line 181): attachments.resolve(String.format("Screenshot_%s.%s", uuid, ext))

Since resolve() allows absolute paths or ../ sequences to escape the base directory, any file readable by the process can be exfiltrated.

PoC

  1. Create a directory named allure-results.

  2. Create a file malicious-result.json inside it:

{
  "uuid": "poc-traversal",
  "name": "Path Traversal PoC",
  "status": "passed",
  "attachments": [
    {
      "name": "Sensitive Data",
      "source": "../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
      "type": "text/plain"
    }
  ]
}
  1. run allure generate allure-results -o allure-report

  2. The content of /etc/passwd will now be present in allure-report/data/attachments/.

Impact

This is a High Severity vulnerability. In CI/CD environments (GitHub Actions, Jenkins), an attacker submitting a Pull Request can exfiltrate server secrets, cloud credentials, or environment configuration files stored on the runner disk. It also may affect custom Allure web services where users can upload results, allowing them to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. Allure TestOps is not affected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.qameta.allure:allure-generatorall versions2.38.0io.qameta.allure:allure-generator:2.38.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
allure reportqameta
< 2.38.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.qameta.allure:allure-generator, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.qameta.allure:allure-generator to 2.38.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report. ### Details The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw in your dependencies?

Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.

Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal…