GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw — allure-generator
HIGHGHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in io.qameta.allure:allure-generator. A fix is available for io.qameta.allure:allure-generator — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Attachment Processing (Allure 1, Allure 2, and XCTest Readers)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
io.qameta.allure:allure-generatorReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report.
Details
The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if the resulting file remains within the intended results directory.
Affected Files and Lines:
Allure2Plugin.java (Line 264): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());
Allure1Plugin.java (Line 328): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());
XcTestPlugin.java (Line 181): attachments.resolve(String.format("Screenshot_%s.%s", uuid, ext))
Since resolve() allows absolute paths or ../ sequences to escape the base directory, any file readable by the process can be exfiltrated.
PoC
-
Create a directory named allure-results.
-
Create a file malicious-result.json inside it:
{
"uuid": "poc-traversal",
"name": "Path Traversal PoC",
"status": "passed",
"attachments": [
{
"name": "Sensitive Data",
"source": "../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
"type": "text/plain"
}
]
}
-
run
allure generate allure-results -o allure-report -
The content of
/etc/passwdwill now be present inallure-report/data/attachments/.
Impact
This is a High Severity vulnerability. In CI/CD environments (GitHub Actions, Jenkins), an attacker submitting a Pull Request can exfiltrate server secrets, cloud credentials, or environment configuration files stored on the runner disk. It also may affect custom Allure web services where users can upload results, allowing them to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. Allure TestOps is not affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.qameta.allure:allure-generator | all versions | 2.38.0io.qameta.allure:allure-generator:2.38.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.qameta.allure:allure-generator, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.qameta.allure:allure-generator to 2.38.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.