GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw
HIGHGHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in io.qameta.allure:allure-generator. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Allure Report has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Attachment Processing (Allure 1, Allure 2, and XCTest Readers)
Blast Radius
io.qameta.allure:allure-generatorReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Allure report generator is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report.
Details
The vulnerability exists in several plugins where attachment paths are resolved using unvalidated user input. The code uses Path.resolve() without normalizing the path or checking if the resulting file remains within the intended results directory.
Affected Files and Lines:
Allure2Plugin.java (Line 264): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());
Allure1Plugin.java (Line 328): final Path attachmentFile = source.resolve(attachment.getSource());
XcTestPlugin.java (Line 181): attachments.resolve(String.format("Screenshot_%s.%s", uuid, ext))
Since resolve() allows absolute paths or ../ sequences to escape the base directory, any file readable by the process can be exfiltrated.
PoC
-
Create a directory named allure-results.
-
Create a file malicious-result.json inside it:
{
"uuid": "poc-traversal",
"name": "Path Traversal PoC",
"status": "passed",
"attachments": [
{
"name": "Sensitive Data",
"source": "../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd",
"type": "text/plain"
}
]
}
-
run
allure generate allure-results -o allure-report -
The content of
/etc/passwdwill now be present inallure-report/data/attachments/.
Impact
This is a High Severity vulnerability. In CI/CD environments (GitHub Actions, Jenkins), an attacker submitting a Pull Request can exfiltrate server secrets, cloud credentials, or environment configuration files stored on the runner disk. It also may affect custom Allure web services where users can upload results, allowing them to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. Allure TestOps is not affected.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.qameta.allure:allure-generator | all versions | 2.38.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.qameta.allure:allure-generator. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.qameta.allure:allure-generator to 2.38.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-64hm-gfwq-jppw across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.