GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw
MEDIUMCoder's workspace app CORS origin check can be bypassed via UUID-based subdomain spoofing
Blast Radius
github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Coder's subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL's username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname.
Note: Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker's crafted app URL while authenticated.
Impact
An authenticated user could craft a subdomain encoding their own workspace UUID and a victim's username. If the victim visited the attacker's URL, the attacker's JavaScript could issue credentialed cross-origin fetch() requests to the victim's workspace apps and read the responses, exfiltrating data accessible through those apps.
Patches
The fix validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace's actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
Workarounds
None.
Resources
- Fix: #26086, #26085
Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22434) for independently disclosing this issue!
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.34.0&&< 2.34.2 | 2.34.2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.33.0&&< 2.33.8 | 2.33.8 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.30.0&&< 2.32.7 | 2.32.7 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | all versions | 2.29.17 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coder/coder/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.34.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5wg6-jmq2-53pw across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.