How severe is GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 affects the following packages: github.com/akuity/kargo (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

Update github.com/akuity/kargo to 1.9.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/akuity/kargo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Is GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 8th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4?

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 is classified as CWE-862 (CWE-862). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 was published on February 19, 2026 and was last updated on February 23, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 — kargo

Fix: akuity/kargo@833314c

GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 is a CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/akuity/kargo. A fix is available for github.com/akuity/kargo — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Kargo has Missing Authorization Vulnerabilities in Approval & Promotion REST API Endpoints

Also known asCVE-2026-27111GO-2026-4515

Published

Feb 19, 2026

Updated

Feb 23, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs8th percentile — riskier than 8% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/akuity/kargo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Kargo's authorization model includes a promote verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes "dolphin verb" -- that gates the ability to advance Freight through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to manage promotion-related resources from the ability to trigger promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation.

The promote verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Kubernetes RBAC for the underlying resource operations (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). This permits users who hold those standard permissions -- but who were deliberately not granted promote -- to bypass the intended authorization boundary.

The affected endpoints are:

POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/freight/{freight}/approve

Approves Freight for promotion to a specific Stage.

The endpoint is intended to require both patch permission on Freight status and promote permission on the target Stage, but asserts only the former.
POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions

Promotes Freight to a specific Stage.

The endpoint is intended to require both create permission on Promotion resources and promote permission on the target Stage, but asserts only the former.
POST /v1beta1/projects/{project}/stages/{stage}/promotions/downstream

Promotes Freight to all Stages immediately downstream of a given Stage.

The endpoint is intended to require both create permission on Promotion resources and promote permission on each downstream Stage, but asserts only the former.

Base Metrics

The following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics.

Attack Vector (AV): Network

The affected endpoints are part of Kargo's newer REST API, which is served over HTTP/HTTPS. (The analogous endpoints of the legacy gRPC API correctly check promote permission and are not affected.) No local or physical access is required.

Attack Complexity (AC): Low

The attack requires only well-formed API requests to the affected endpoints.

Attack Requirements (AT): None

No specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.

Privileges Required (PR): Low

The attacker must hold permissions to patch Freight status and/or create Promotion resources. These are standard operational permissions commonly granted to some Kargo users and do not represent what CVSS formally considers administrative or elevated access.

User Interaction (UI): None

The attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.

Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): None

The vulnerability does not expose any data from the Kargo control plane.

Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): Low

The attacker can coerce a Stage into a state it might not otherwise transition to. This constitutes bounded state corruption within a single Project. Kargo itself continues to function correctly.

Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): None

Promotion resources created by exploitation of this vulnerability consume the same controller resources as a legitimate Promotion would. A user with proper promote permissions could generate identical load. The vulnerability does not introduce any new avenue for resource exhaustion.

Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): None

The vulnerability does not provide any mechanism for the attacker to read data from downstream systems.

Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): Low

Critically, the attacker does not control the content of Freight resources without artifact repositories also having been compromised. In isolation, which is how vulnerabilities are scored, the worst consequence of a successful attack is downstream systems (e.g. Argo CD) deploying incorrect revisions of artifacts, which in some cases should have been rejected by bypassed segments of the promotion pipeline. Though the operational consequences land on subsequent systems, they are bounded by the attacker's inability to inject arbitrary content.

Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): None

The attack does not provide any mechanism to degrade the availability of downstream systems beyond what could be achieved with legitimately promoted Freight.

Mitigating Factors

Only the REST API endpoints introduced in v1.9.0 are affected. The legacy gRPC API and the Kargo UI (which uses the gRPC API) correctly enforce the promote permission check and are not vulnerable.
The window of affected versions is narrow: v1.9.0 through v1.9.2.
Exploitation requires authentication to the Kargo API server and specific operational permissions (patch on freights/status or create on promotions). Anonymous or minimally privileged users cannot exploit this vulnerability.
Impact is bounded to a single Project. The promote bypass does not enable cross-Project access or escalation beyond the namespace in which the attacker already holds the prerequisite permissions.
There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/akuity/kargo`	≥ 1.9.0&&< 1.9.3	1.9.3`go get github.com/akuity/kargo@v1.9.3`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/akuity/kargo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/akuity/kargo to 1.9.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Kargo's authorization model includes a `promote` verb -- a non-standard Kubernetes ["dolphin verb"](https://www.aquasec.com/blog/kubernetes-verbs/) -- that gates the ability to advance `Freight` through a promotion pipeline. This verb exists to separate the ability to _manage_ promotion-related resources from the ability to _trigger_ promotions, enabling fine-grained access control over what is often a sensitive operation. The `promote` verb is correctly enforced in Kargo's legacy gRPC API. However, three endpoints in the newer REST API omit this check, relying only on standard Ku

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-5vvm-67pj-72g4 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

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