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HIGH severity

pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specificationGHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7

HIGH

GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-284 vulnerability in pnpm. A fix is available for pnpm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2023-37478
Published
Updated
Affected
17 pkgs
Patched
17 / 17
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 30, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs68th percentile — riskier than 68% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.44%1.03%1.61%2.20%1.6%1.2%May 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

17 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

410other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
pnpmnpm
308.0Mdownloads / week
@pnpm/exenpm
9.6Mdownloads / week
@pnpm/linux-arm64npm
898Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives.

Details

The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, package.json, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored.

This is further complicated by that during tarball extraction, all package managers are configured to drop the first path component, so collisions can be created simply by using multiple root folders in the archive, even without performing updates.

When pnpm extracts a tar archive via tar-stream, it appears to extract only the first file of a given name and discards all subsequent files with the same name.

PoC

Create a root folder with the following layout:

  • a/package.json
  • package/package.json
  • z/package.json

File contents:

a/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^15"
    }
}

package/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^16"
    }
}

z/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is the good version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^17"
    }
}

Then use the tar binary to produce a tarball (working directory is the root folder): tar -c -z --format ustar -f package.tgz a package z The order of the folders at the end matters; whichever one is last will end up being the package.json that wins when extracted by npm; the one that is first will be the one that wins when extracted by pnpm.

Install the tarball via the file: protocol.

Observe that with npm, the lockfile has react@17, while with pnpm it has react@15.

Impact

This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm.

Affected Packages

17 total 17 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpmall versions7.33.4npm install pnpm@7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/exeall versions7.33.4npm install @pnpm/exe@7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linux-arm64all versions7.33.4npm install @pnpm/linux-arm64@7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linux-x64all versions7.33.4npm install @pnpm/linux-x64@7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linuxstatic-arm64all versions7.33.4npm install @pnpm/linuxstatic-arm64@7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/macos-arm64all versions7.33.4npm install @pnpm/macos-arm64@7.33.4

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
pnpmpnpm
≥ 8.0.0 && < 8.6.8
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 7.33.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives. ### Details The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, `package.json`, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored. This is furthe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7: pnpm — Fixed in 7.33.4