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📦 npm

GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7

HIGH

pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specification

Also known asCVE-2023-37478
Published
Aug 1, 2023
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
17 pkgs
Patched
17 / 17
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk56th percentile-0.77%
0.43%1.02%1.61%2.20%1.4%0.9%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

17 pkgs affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

pnpmnpm
114.8Mdownloads / week
@pnpm/exenpm
3.7Mdownloads / week
@pnpm/linux-arm64npm
282Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives.

Details

The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, package.json, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored.

This is further complicated by that during tarball extraction, all package managers are configured to drop the first path component, so collisions can be created simply by using multiple root folders in the archive, even without performing updates.

When pnpm extracts a tar archive via tar-stream, it appears to extract only the first file of a given name and discards all subsequent files with the same name.

PoC

Create a root folder with the following layout:

  • a/package.json
  • package/package.json
  • z/package.json

File contents:

a/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^15"
    }
}

package/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^16"
    }
}

z/package.json

{
    "name": "test-package",
    "version": "0.1.0",
    "description": "This is the good version of a test package",
    "dependencies": {
        "react": "^17"
    }
}

Then use the tar binary to produce a tarball (working directory is the root folder): tar -c -z --format ustar -f package.tgz a package z The order of the folders at the end matters; whichever one is last will end up being the package.json that wins when extracted by npm; the one that is first will be the one that wins when extracted by pnpm.

Install the tarball via the file: protocol.

Observe that with npm, the lockfile has react@17, while with pnpm it has react@15.

Impact

This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm.

Affected Packages

17 total 17 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmpnpmall versions7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/exeall versions7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linux-arm64all versions7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linux-x64all versions7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/linuxstatic-arm64all versions7.33.4
📦npm@pnpm/macos-arm64all versions7.33.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pnpm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update pnpm to 7.33.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives. ### Details The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, `package.json`, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored. This is furthe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5r98-f33j-g8h7 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.