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Hono: `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time, leading to bypass of middleware on static pathsGHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7

MEDIUMFix: honojs/hono@8b05c77

GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-174 vulnerability in hono. A fix is available for hono — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-109955CVE-2026-111757
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs23th percentile — riskier than 23% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

6Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
hononpm
48.0Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

serveStatic decodes the request path a second time after Hono has already decoded it for routing. A crafted request can be routed as one path and served as another, so middleware mounted on a static prefix does not run for a file under that prefix.

Details

Hono decodes the request path once before routing. serveStatic decoded it again before resolving the file. With a malformed percent-encoded sequence, the first decode leaves part of the path encoded, the router matches the encoded form, and the second decode resolves the real directory. The file is still resolved inside the configured root; this is not a traversal outside it.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker may reach static files without the middleware on their prefix running, for example an authentication check. This affects applications that mount middleware on part of the directory served by serveStatic. Applications that serve only public files are not affected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhono≥ 4.12.4&&< 4.13.114.13.11npm install hono@4.13.11

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.13.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

A MODERATE severity flaw was found in the Hono web framework, an npm dependency shipped in several Red Hat products, including Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Red Hat In-Vehicle OS (grafana), Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces, Red Hat OpenShift AI, Migration Toolkit for Applications, Ansible Automation Platform and Ansible…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-5r4p-p66f-jhc7 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana12-4-main-12.4.12-0.5.hum1RHSA-2026:84422
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-1-main-13.1.7-0.2.hum1RHSA-2026:84423
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-2-main-13.2.3-0.2.hum1RHSA-2026:84431

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `serveStatic` decodes the request path a second time after Hono has already decoded it for routing. A crafted request can be routed as one path and served as another, so middleware mounted on a static prefix does not run for a file under that prefix. ### Details Hono decodes the request path once before routing. `serveStatic` decoded it again before resolving the file. With a malformed percent-encoded sequence, the first decode leaves part of the path encoded, the router matches the encoded form, and the second decode resolves the real directory. The file is still resolved insid
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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