@mobilenext/mobile-mcp: Arbitrary Android Intent Execution via mobile_open_urlGHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm
HIGHFix: mobile-next/mobile-mcp#299GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) CWE-939 vulnerability in @mobilenext/mobile-mcp. A fix is available for @mobilenext/mobile-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@mobilenext/mobile-mcpnpmDescription
Summary
The mobile_open_url tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android's intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access.
Details
The vulnerable code passes URLs directly to adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d <url> without checking the URL scheme. This can enable malicious schemes such as tel:, sms:, mailto:, content://, and market:// to be executed.
Since MCP servers are designed to be operated by AI agents, which are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, a malicious document or website could inject instructions that cause the AI to execute dangerous intents on a connected mobile device.
Impact
An attacker via prompt injection can:
- Execute USSD codes (e.g.,
tel:*#06#to display IMEI - confirmed on Pixel 7a, behavior varies by device; or device-specific factory reset codes) - Initiate phone calls to premium rate numbers
- Draft SMS messages with attacker-controlled content
- Access content providers (contacts, SMS, call logs)
- Open app installation prompts
Proof of Concept
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"mobile_open_url","arguments":{"device":"<id>","url":"tel:*#06#"}}}
Result: IMEI displayed on device.
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"mobile_open_url","arguments":{"device":"<id>","url":"sms:1234567890?body=HACKED"}}}
Result: SMS app opens with a pre-filled message.
Remediation
Upgrade to version 0.0.50 or later, which restricts mobile_open_url to http:// and https:// schemes by default. Users who require other URL schemes can opt in by setting MOBILEMCP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_URLS=1.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @mobilenext/mobile-mcp | all versions | 0.0.50npm install @mobilenext/mobile-mcp@0.0.50 |
Affected Products
mobile mcpmobilenexthqDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @mobilenext/mobile-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @mobilenext/mobile-mcp to 0.0.50 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.