GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) CWE-939 vulnerability in @mobilenext/mobile-mcp. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
@mobilenext/mobile-mcp: Arbitrary Android Intent Execution via mobile_open_url
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
@mobilenext/mobile-mcpnpmDescription
Summary
The mobile_open_url tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android's intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access.
Details
The vulnerable code passes URLs directly to adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d <url> without checking the URL scheme. This can enable malicious schemes such as tel:, sms:, mailto:, content://, and market:// to be executed.
Since MCP servers are designed to be operated by AI agents, which are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, a malicious document or website could inject instructions that cause the AI to execute dangerous intents on a connected mobile device.
Impact
An attacker via prompt injection can:
- Execute USSD codes (e.g.,
tel:*#06#to display IMEI - confirmed on Pixel 7a, behavior varies by device; or device-specific factory reset codes) - Initiate phone calls to premium rate numbers
- Draft SMS messages with attacker-controlled content
- Access content providers (contacts, SMS, call logs)
- Open app installation prompts
Proof of Concept
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"mobile_open_url","arguments":{"device":"<id>","url":"tel:*#06#"}}}
Result: IMEI displayed on device.
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"mobile_open_url","arguments":{"device":"<id>","url":"sms:1234567890?body=HACKED"}}}
Result: SMS app opens with a pre-filled message.
Remediation
Upgrade to version 0.0.50 or later, which restricts mobile_open_url to http:// and https:// schemes by default. Users who require other URL schemes can opt in by setting MOBILEMCP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_URLS=1.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @mobilenext/mobile-mcp | all versions | 0.0.50 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @mobilenext/mobile-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @mobilenext/mobile-mcp to 0.0.50 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.