How severe is GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v?

GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v has a CVSS score of 5.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v?

GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v affects the following packages: io.netty:netty-codec-http (Maven). Ecosystems affected: Maven.

How do I fix GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v?

Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.1.108.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v in my Maven dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v?

GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 1.4%, placing it in the 69th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

When was GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v was published on March 25, 2024 and was last updated on February 4, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

☕ Maven

GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v

MEDIUM

Netty's HttpPostRequestDecoder can OOM

Also known asCVE-2024-29025

Published

Mar 25, 2024

Updated

Feb 4, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

1.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk69th percentile+1.04%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

☕io.netty:netty-codec-http

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The HttpPostRequestDecoder can be tricked to accumulate data. I have spotted currently two attack vectors

Details

While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the bodyListHttpData list.
The decoder cumulates bytes in the undecodedChunk buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits

PoC

Here is a Netty branch that provides a fix + tests : https://github.com/vietj/netty/tree/post-request-decoder

Here is a reproducer with Vert.x (which uses this decoder) https://gist.github.com/vietj/f558b8ea81ec6505f1e9a6ca283c9ae3

Impact

Any Netty based HTTP server that uses the HttpPostRequestDecoder to decode a form.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
☕Maven	`io.netty:netty-codec-http`	all versions	4.1.108.Final

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-http. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-http to 4.1.108.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. I have spotted currently two attack vectors ### Details 1. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. 2. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits ### PoC Here is a Netty branch that provides a fix + tests : https://githu

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-5jpm-x58v-624v across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works