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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

hickory-resolver: Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs obscure DNSSEC validation failuresGHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

HIGHFix: hickory-dns/hickory-dns#3871

GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-347 vulnerability in hickory-resolver. A fix is available for hickory-resolver — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-93657
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs33th percentile — riskier than 33% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 395,249 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀hickory-resolver

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iohickory-resolverall versions0.26.2cargo update -p hickory-resolver --precise 0.26.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hickory-resolver, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update hickory-resolver to 0.26.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This vulnerability is rated as Important because an attacker can forge DNS responses that bypass cryptographic validation, potentially redirecting network communications or serving fraudulent cryptographic keys to trusting applications. In Red Hat environments, the hickory-resolver crate is statically embedded within…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10rust-sequoia-sq-0:1.4.0.1-4.el10_2RHSA-2026:85848
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25rhoai/odh-fms-guardrails-orchestrator-rhel9:1791535252RHSA-2026:87410
Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4rhoai/odh-fms-guardrails-orchestrator-rhel9:1791862392RHSA-2026:84734
Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.5rhoai/odh-fms-guardrails-orchestrator-rhel9:1791947291RHSA-2026:86891

Frequently Asked Questions

When calling `Resolver::lookup()` or `Resolver::lookup_ip()` on a resolver with DNSSEC validation enabled, both methods return `Ok(...)` if DNSSEC validation fails. It is possible but very inconvenient to check the validation status of individual records. These methods should instead return an error when DNSSEC validation determines a response is bogus.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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