GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w
MEDIUMCoder's subdomain workspace app routing trusts unauthenticated X-Forwarded-Host header, enabling cross-app data access
Blast Radius
github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The workspace app proxy resolves the target app from httpapi.RequestHost() which prefers the X-Forwarded-Host header over the real Host header. No middleware strips X-Forwarded-Host before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on fetch() calls.
Note: Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled, a victim who visits the attacker's shared app and a deployment whose upstream proxy does not strip
X-Forwarded-Host.
Impact
App session cookies are scoped to the wildcard parent domain so the browser attaches them to any app subdomain. An attacker who controls a shared workspace app can serve JavaScript that sends same-site requests with a forged X-Forwarded-Host pointing at a victim's private app. The server routes by the attacker-controlled header but authorizes with the victim's cookie which lets the attacker read the victim's private app responses. Subdomain app routing must be enabled and no upstream proxy may strip X-Forwarded-Host.
Patches
The fix trusts X-Forwarded-Host only from configured trusted proxies and otherwise resolves the routing host from the verified request host.
The fix was backported to all supported release lines:
Workarounds
Place an upstream reverse proxy that strips or overwrites X-Forwarded-Host on untrusted requests.
Resources
- Fix: #26204
Credits
Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22435) for independently disclosing this issue!
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.34.0&&< 2.34.2 | 2.34.2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.33.0&&< 2.33.8 | 2.33.8 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | ≥ 2.30.0&&< 2.32.7 | 2.32.7 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/coder/coder/v2 | all versions | 2.29.17 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coder/coder/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.34.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-5g4w-3vw9-478w across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.