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GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf backend

MEDIUMFix: enchant97/note-mark@9c9b727

GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend. A fix is available for github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Note Mark: Unauthenticated disclosure of soft-deleted note metadata via deleted=true on public books

Also known asCVE-2026-50554GO-2026-5948
Published
Jul 9, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GET /api/books/{bookID}/notes is an unauthenticated endpoint that accepts a "deleted" query parameter. When the request is ?deleted=true, the service runs the query with Unscoped() (bypassing GORM's soft-delete scope) but keeps the read-authorization clause as "owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?". As a result, any unauthenticated caller can enumerate the metadata of soft-deleted ("trashed") notes belonging to any public book — notes the owner explicitly deleted and expected to be removed from public view.

Affected component (code-verified)

backend/services/notes.go — GetNotesByBookID (lines 72-89):

func (s NotesService) GetNotesByBookID(currentUserID *uuid.UUID, bookID uuid.UUID, deleted bool) ([]db.Note, error) { tx := db.DB if deleted { tx = tx.Unscoped() // <-- bypasses soft-delete scope } tx = tx. Preload("Book"). Joins("JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id"). Where( db.DB.Where("books.id = ?", bookID), db.DB.Where("owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?", currentUserID, true), // <-- is_public still honored for trash ) if deleted { tx = tx.Where("notes.deleted_at IS NOT NULL") } var notes []db.Note return notes, dbErrorToServiceError(tx.Find(&notes).Error) }

Route registration confirms the endpoint has no AuthRequiredMiddleware (backend/handlers/notes.go:37), and the deleted flag is attacker-controlled (backend/handlers/notes.go:86 — Deleted bool with query:"deleted").

Proof of concept

  1. A victim owns a public book (is_public = true), creates a note, then soft-deletes it (moves it to trash). The note still exists in the DB with deleted_at set.
  2. An unauthenticated attacker who knows (or enumerates) the book UUID requests: GET /api/books/<bookID>/notes?deleted=true
  3. The response lists the soft-deleted note(s) — id, title, slug, timestamps — even though the attacker is not authenticated and the owner intended the note to be deleted.

Impact

Exposure of soft-deleted note metadata (title, slug, timestamps) of public books to unauthenticated actors. The note body is not exposed — the content endpoint (GetNoteContent) does not use Unscoped(), so its count query returns 0 for soft-deleted notes and yields 404. Impact is therefore limited to metadata disclosure and the bypass of the intended "delete" semantics on public books.

Remediation

Restrict trash (soft-deleted) listings to the book owner only — never honor the is_public branch when deleted=true:

func (s NotesService) GetNotesByBookID(currentUserID *uuid.UUID, bookID uuid.UUID, deleted bool) ([]db.Note, error) { tx := db.DB if deleted { tx = tx.Unscoped() }

  • // Soft-deleted ("trash") notes must only ever be listed to the book owner.
    
  • authz := db.DB.Where("owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?", currentUserID, true)
    
  • if deleted {
    
  •         authz = db.DB.Where("owner_id = ?", currentUserID)
    
  • }
    tx = tx.
            Preload("Book").
            Joins("JOIN books ON books.id = notes.book_id").
            Where(
                    db.DB.Where("books.id = ?", bookID),
    
  •                 db.DB.Where("owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?", currentUserID, true),
    
  •                 authz,
            )
    if deleted {
            tx = tx.Where("notes.deleted_at IS NOT NULL")
    }
    var notes []db.Note
    return notes, dbErrorToServiceError(tx.Find(&notes).Error)
    

}

With this change, when currentUserID is nil (unauthenticated) and deleted=true, the clause becomes owner_id = NULL, which matches nothing — so trash is never exposed to anonymous callers.

Coordinated disclosure / CVE request

We have reported this privately and are happy to assist with any further validation or testing you need. If you agree this qualifies as a security vulnerability, we would be grateful if you could request a CVE ID for it — GitHub lets maintainers request a CVE directly from this advisory page once it is accepted. Thank you for your time and for maintaining note-mark.

References

  • CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-285: Improper Authorization
  • Prior note-mark authorization fix (CVE-2026-40265) established that read paths must scope by owner_id OR is_public; this report covers the trash path that the scope did not fully cover.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/enchant97/note-mark/backendall versions0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22go get github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend@v0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend to 0.0.0-20260601210758-9c9b72740f22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Summary GET /api/books/{bookID}/notes is an unauthenticated endpoint that accepts a "deleted" query parameter. When the request is ?deleted=true, the service runs the query with Unscoped() (bypassing GORM's soft-delete scope) but keeps the read-authorization clause as "owner_id = ? OR is_public = ?". As a result, any unauthenticated caller can enumerate the metadata of soft-deleted ("trashed") notes belonging to any public book — notes the owner explicitly deleted and expected to be removed from public view. Affected component (code-verified) backend/services/notes.go — GetNotes
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf: backend (Medium 5.3) | O3 Security