Devise has a confirmable "change email" race condition permits user to confirm email they have no access toGHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc
MEDIUMFix: heartcombo/devise#5784GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-362 vulnerability in devise. A fix is available for devise — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
deviseReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A race condition in Devise's Confirmable module allows an attacker to confirm an email address they do not own. This affects any Devise application using the reconfirmable option (the default when using Confirmable with email changes).
By sending two concurrent email change requests, an attacker can desynchronize the confirmation_token and unconfirmed_email fields. The confirmation token is sent to an email the attacker controls, but the unconfirmed_email in the database points to a victim's email address. When the attacker uses the token, the victim's email is confirmed on the attacker's account.
Patches
This is patched in Devise v5.0.3. Users should upgrade as soon as possible.
Workarounds
Applications can override this specific method from Devise models to force unconfirmed_email to be persisted when unchanged: (assuming your model is User)
class User < ApplicationRecord
protected
def postpone_email_change_until_confirmation_and_regenerate_confirmation_token
unconfirmed_email_will_change!
super
end
end
Note: Mongoid does not seem to respect that will_change! should force the attribute to be persisted, even if it did not really change, so you might have to implement a workaround similar to Devise by setting changed_attributes["unconfirmed_email"] = nil as well.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | devise | all versions | 5.0.3bundle update devise --conservative |
Affected Products
deviseheartcomboDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for devise, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update devise to 5.0.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-57hq-95w6-v4fc in your dependencies?
Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.