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Signature Validation BypassGHSA-5684-g483-2249

GHSA-5684-g483-2249 is a security vulnerability in github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2. A fix is available for github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 5, 2021 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Given a valid SAML Response, an attacker can potentially modify the document, bypassing signature validation in order to pass off the altered document as a signed one.

This enables a variety of attacks, including users accessing accounts other than the one to which they authenticated in the identity provider, or full authentication bypass if an external attacker can obtain an expired, signed SAML Response.

Patches

A patch is available, users of gosaml2 should upgrade to v0.5.0 or higher.

References

See the underlying advisory on goxmldsig for more details.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/russellhaering/gosaml2all versions0.5.0go get github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2@v0.5.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/russellhaering/gosaml2 to 0.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-5684-g483-2249 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Given a valid SAML Response, an attacker can potentially modify the document, bypassing signature validation in order to pass off the altered document as a signed one. This enables a variety of attacks, including users accessing accounts other than the one to which they authenticated in the identity provider, or full authentication bypass if an external attacker can obtain an expired, signed SAML Response. ### Patches A patch is available, users of gosaml2 should upgrade to v0.5.0 or higher. ### References See the [underlying advisory on goxmldsig](https://github.com/russellhaeri
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Signature Validation Bypass