Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verificationGHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq
Fix: symfony/symfony@8545fb2GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq is a Missing Authentication vulnerability in symfony/symfony. A fix is available for symfony/symfony — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
symfony/symfony🐘symfony/symfony🐘symfony/symfony🐘symfony/twilio-notifier🐘symfony/twilio-notifier🐘symfony/twilio-notifierReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
The Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its doParse(Request $request, #[\SensitiveParameter] string $secret) method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the X-Twilio-Signature HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.
As a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts any POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.
Resolution
TwilioRequestParser::doParse() now requires and verifies the X-Twilio-Signature header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.
When no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted in.
Applications behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy must configure framework.trusted_proxies and framework.trusted_headers so that Request::getUri() returns the public URL Twilio signed.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 6.4.
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Himanshu Anand for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/symfony | ≥ 6.4.0&&< 6.4.40 | 6.4.40composer require symfony/symfony:^6.4.40 |
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/symfony | ≥ 7.0.0&&< 7.4.12 | 7.4.12composer require symfony/symfony:^7.4.12 |
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/symfony | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.12 | 8.0.12composer require symfony/symfony:^8.0.12 |
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/twilio-notifier | ≥ 6.4.0&&< 6.4.40 | 6.4.40composer require symfony/twilio-notifier:^6.4.40 |
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/twilio-notifier | ≥ 7.0.0&&< 7.4.12 | 7.4.12composer require symfony/twilio-notifier:^7.4.12 |
| 🐘Packagist | symfony/twilio-notifier | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.12 | 8.0.12composer require symfony/twilio-notifier:^8.0.12 |
Affected Products
symfonysensiolabsDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for symfony/symfony, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update symfony/symfony to 6.4.40 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.