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CVE-2026-48747 — mailomat-mailer

Fix: symfony/symfony@bdfe9fe

CVE-2026-48747 is a CWE-347 vulnerability in symfony/mailomat-mailer. A fix is available for symfony/mailomat-mailer — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade

Also known asGHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr
Published
Updated
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-48747.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.75%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected
🐘symfony/mailomat-mailer🐘symfony/mailomat-mailer🐘symfony/symfony🐘symfony/symfony

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature() parses the X-MOM-Webhook-Signature request header as algo=signature and passes the wire-supplied $algo directly to hash_hmac() when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.

PHP's hash_hmac() enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (md4, md5, ripemd128, tiger128,3, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT alg=none / alg=HS256 downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.

Mailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.

Resolution

MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature() now requires the signature header to be of the form sha256=<hex> and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsymfony/mailomat-mailer≥ 7.2.0&&< 7.4.137.4.13composer require symfony/mailomat-mailer:^7.4.13
🐘Packagistsymfony/mailomat-mailer≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.138.0.13composer require symfony/mailomat-mailer:^8.0.13
🐘Packagistsymfony/symfony≥ 7.2.0&&< 7.4.137.4.13composer require symfony/symfony:^7.4.13
🐘Packagistsymfony/symfony≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.0.138.0.13composer require symfony/symfony:^8.0.13

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
symfonysensiolabs
≥ 8.0.0 && < 8.0.13
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for symfony/mailomat-mailer, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update symfony/mailomat-mailer to 7.4.13 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-48747 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-48747: mailomat-mailer — Fixed in 7.4.13