GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f is a low-severity (CVSS 3.3) Path Traversal vulnerability in dulwich. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Dulwich doesn't sanitize commit subjects in `porcelain.format_patch`
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 367,996 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
dulwichReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, ), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch").
A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples:
- x/../../x produced <outdir>/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving two directories above outdir.
- x....\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator.
Related issues from the same root cause:
- Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on Windows, where git would have succeeded.
- Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them.
Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process's write permissions.
Patches
Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade.
dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only [A-Za-z0-9._] are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject.
Workarounds
Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can:
- Use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename.
- Validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir.
- Pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, , .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem.
Resources
- Fix commit: https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b
- Affected API: dulwich.porcelain.format_patch / dulwich format-patch
- Reference behavior: git's format_sanitized_subject in pretty.c
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | dulwich | ≥ 0.24.0&&< 1.2.5 | 1.2.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for dulwich. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update dulwich to 1.2.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-555p-6grf-mh7f across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.