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GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h

HIGH

GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-284 vulnerability in ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

CI4MS: Account Deletion Module Grants Full Persistent Unauthorized Access for All‑Roles via Improper Session Invalidation (Logic Flaw)

Also known asCVE-2026-34570
Published
Apr 1, 2026
Updated
Apr 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Vulnerability: Improper Session Invalidation on Account Deletion (Broken Access Control / Logic Flaw)

  • This vulnerability is caused by a backend logic flaw that maintains a false trust assumption that already-authenticated users remain trustworthy, even after their accounts are explicitly deleted. As a result, administrative security actions do not behave as intended, allowing persistent unauthorized access.

Description

The application fails to immediately revoke active user sessions when an account is deleted. Due to a logic flaw in the backend design, account state changes are enforced only during authentication (login), not for already-established sessions.

The system implicitly assumes that authenticated users remain trusted for the lifetime of their session. There is no session expiration or account expiration mechanism in place, causing deleted accounts to retain indefinite access until the user manually logs out. This behavior breaks the intended access control policy and results in persistent unauthorized access, representing a critical security flaw.

Affected Functionality

  • User session management and authentication logic
  • Account deletion mechanism
  • All authenticated endpoints, including administrative and content interfaces

Attack Scenario

  • A user logs into the application.
  • An administrator deletes the user account.
  • The user remains fully logged in and can continue performing all actions allowed by their role indefinitely, as there is no session expiration.
  • The user can continue invoking backend methods, triggering application actions, accessing sensitive interfaces (including user management if permitted), and interacting with the system as if the account were still active.
  • Access is only lost if the user manually logs out, which may never occur.

Impact

  • Unauthorized Continued Access: Deleted users retain full access indefinitely, violating intended access control and expected security behavior.
  • Bypass of Administrative Controls: Administrative actions (deletion) fail to immediately restrict active sessions.
  • Logic Flaw Resulting in Broken Behavior: Backend authorization logic relies on a flawed trust assumption that authenticated users remain valid, enforcing account state only at login.
  • Full Functional Access Retained: Deleted users can continue invoking application methods, executing actions, interacting with protected endpoints, and using the system exactly as before deletion.
  • Privilege Abuse: Users with elevated roles (moderator, editor, administrator) can continue performing privileged actions after account deletion, including accessing user management interfaces and modifying application state.
  • Service Disruption Potential: Persistent access allows attackers to disrupt services, manipulate content, or interfere with normal application operations.
  • Attack Persistence: Attackers can maintain access indefinitely, increasing the risk of data exfiltration, unauthorized modifications, or further privilege escalation.
  • False Sense of Remediation: Administrators may believe a threat has been mitigated while the deleted user remains active within the system.

Endpoint Example: Any endpoint accessible to authenticated users, including dashboards, administrative interfaces, user management pages, and API endpoints.

Steps To Reproduce (PoC)

  1. Create or use an existing user account.
  2. Log into the application using this account.
  3. From an administrative account, delete the logged-in user account.
  4. Observe that the target user remains authenticated.
  5. Verify that the user can still access protected functionality, invoke actions, and interact with the application as before.
  6. Confirm that the user only loses access after manually logging out (if they choose to do so).

Remediation

  • Immediately invalidate all active sessions when an account is deleted.
  • Enforce account status checks on every authenticated request, not only during login.
  • Introduce proper session expiration or account expiration mechanisms to prevent indefinite access.
  • Correct the backend logic flaw to ensure access control behavior aligns with intended security design and does not rely on unsafe trust assumptions.

Ready Video POC:

https://mega.nz/file/7dlUTQAB#0oXOapF5XYN4DRRG1xYj6DajmuP72MpMdsHqbVBMmWw

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistci4-cms-erp/ci4msall versions0.31.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update ci4-cms-erp/ci4ms to 0.31.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary ### Vulnerability: Improper Session Invalidation on Account Deletion (Broken Access Control / Logic Flaw) - This vulnerability is caused by a backend logic flaw that maintains a false trust assumption that already-authenticated users remain trustworthy, even after their accounts are explicitly deleted. As a result, administrative security actions do not behave as intended, allowing persistent unauthorized access. ### Description The application fails to immediately revoke active user sessions when an account is **deleted**. Due to a logic flaw in the backend design, account state c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-4vxv-4xq4-p84h across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.