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Not in CISA KEV

kas's late signature validation may allow unnoticed repository manipulationsGHSA-4vqc-wpwg-vh7j

Fix: siemens/kas@4cb4a3d

GHSA-4vqc-wpwg-vh7j is a CWE-347 vulnerability in kas. A fix is available for kas — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-47192PYSEC-2026-2543
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-4vqc-wpwg-vh7j.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.75%0.2%0.3%0.3%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍kas

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

So far, kas checks out and processes repositories regarding configuration includes prior to validating signatures of those repositories. This may allow to replace on original repository with one under the control of an attacker under very specific conditions.

First of all, the attacker must have gained control of a repository that a kas file of the victim is referencing. Furthermore, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

  • the victim's kas configuration must include a configuration file from the attacked repository
  • the repository state is referenced by tag, and no commit ID is specified (this is triggering a warning, though)
  • the key used for validating the tag or commit signature is stored as file in a repository
  • no fingerprint for the key is specified
  • the _source_dir key must not be set by the victim when calling kas (e.g. by avoiding a local .config.yaml)

Given these conditions, the attacker could modify the included kas configuration in way that the key used to validate the tag signature of the attacker's repository could be replaced by an attacker-chosen key.

No other exploit possibilities have been identified so far, but this does not rule out that those may exist.

Patches

The vulnerability was introduced with a2480fe59b6421eb96cf3bd86527ae6e412a331e, commit https://github.com/siemens/kas/commit/5b2114becfc154b16ef496d24f8c2191a2297f57 is resolving this issue. A misuse of _source_dir is resolved by commit https://github.com/siemens/kas/commit/c443c0a1fd0f9bd6a689a44d95a252085fc6da88. Shadowing a commit by a branch of the same name is described in advisory https://github.com/siemens/kas/security/advisories/GHSA-qjwp-hrq6-r26r and is addressed by commit https://github.com/siemens/kas/commit/4cb4a3d01122ffaec9feaae768a5814092f6f9b5. All patches have been released along with kas version 5.3.

Workarounds

Pin the expected signature key via its fingerprint, also when storing it as file in a repository.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIkas≥ 4.8&&< 5.35.3pip install --upgrade 'kas==5.3'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for kas, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update kas to 5.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-4vqc-wpwg-vh7j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact So far, kas checks out and processes repositories regarding configuration includes prior to validating signatures of those repositories. This may allow to replace on original repository with one under the control of an attacker under very specific conditions. First of all, the attacker must have gained control of a repository that a kas file of the victim is referencing. Furthermore, the following conditions must be fulfilled: - the victim's kas configuration must include a configuration file from the attacked repository - the repository state is referenced by tag, and no commit
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-4vqc-wpwg-vh7j: kas — Fixed in 5.3