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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-75522 — @openeudi/openid4vp

HIGHFix: openeudi/openid4vp@a3ffd43

CVE-2026-75522 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-295 vulnerability in @openeudi/openid4vp. A fix is available for @openeudi/openid4vp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenID4VP: X.509 chain validation accepts a forged certificate that reuses a trusted anchor's Subject DN without verifying its signature

Also known asGHSA-4c2f-96cf-f5fc
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs7th percentile — riskier than 7% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦@openeudi/openid4vp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects npm packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

ChainBuilder (the private RFC 5280 validator behind TrustEvaluator and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on Subject Distinguished Name string equality rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus with no signature verification against the anchor's public key.

An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signed with its private key — accepted as issued under a trusted authority.

Impact

A relying party using @openeudi/openid4vp to verify OpenID4VP presentations (mdoc / SD-JWT VC) could be induced to accept a forged credential as genuine, defeating the trust-anchor model. In an eIDAS / EUDI age- or identity-verification deployment this permits impersonation of a trusted issuer.

Exploitable through the public verification path: TrustEvaluator.evaluate() returns a successful result (and, due to a secondary fallback, attributes the forged leaf to a real anchor's metadata), so downstream callers see a trusted outcome.

Details

src/trust/ChainBuilder.ts, tryBuild():

while (current.subject !== anchor.subject) { /* verify & climb */ }
// loop exits when current.subject === anchor.subject
return chain;  // returned WITHOUT verifying `current` against the anchor

The signature-verified closure path (if (!issuer) -> verifySignature(current, anchor)) is correct, but the while guard provides a second, unverified exit: when a supplied certificate (the leaf, or an attacker-supplied intermediate) has a Subject DN string equal to the anchor's, the loop body never runs, no verifySignature call is made, and the chain is returned as valid. The per-certificate checks that do run (validity, algorithm, keyUsage) all operate on the attacker-controlled certificate and do not bind it to the anchor.

Secondary contributing weakness (src/trust/TrustEvaluator.ts): the anchor selected for the result was matched by serialNumber and fell back to anchors[0] when no match was found, so the forged leaf was reported alongside a genuine anchor's trustedAuthorityIds / provenance.

Proof of Concept

// Attacker mints a self-signed cert reusing a trusted anchor's Subject DN.
const impostor = selfSigned({ subject: trustedAnchor.subject /* string */ });
// Vulnerable: resolves to a valid chain [impostor] with no signature check.
await new ChainBuilder().build(impostor, [trustedAnchor]);

Patch

ChainBuilder.tryBuild() now requires the terminating certificate to be byte-identical to the trust anchor (DER rawData comparison) when the loop exits on DN equality; otherwise it throws CertificateChainError with reason: "signature". Cryptographic closure via verifySignature(current, anchor) remains the only other accepted termination. As defense-in-depth, TrustEvaluator now selects the terminating anchor by DER byte-identity and throws instead of silently falling back to the first candidate. Fixed in 0.8.1.

Workarounds

None. Upgrade to 0.8.1.

Credits

Reported by Reza Shokri — Quellkern e.U. (https://augenmass.tech), GitHub @devdotbo. Thanks for the thorough report, the self-contained reproduction, and coordinated disclosure.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@openeudi/openid4vpall versions0.8.1npm install @openeudi/openid4vp@0.8.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @openeudi/openid4vp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @openeudi/openid4vp to 0.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-75522 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `ChainBuilder` (the private RFC 5280 validator behind `TrustEvaluator` and the public credential-parsing API) terminated chain building on **Subject Distinguished Name string equality** rather than on cryptographic closure to a trust anchor. A certificate whose Subject DN string matched a trusted anchor's Subject DN was accepted as the chain terminus **with no signature verification** against the anchor's public key. An attacker who mints a self-signed certificate and copies a trusted anchor's Subject DN string onto it can therefore have that certificate — and any credential signe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-75522: @openeudi/openid4vp — Fixed in 0.8.1